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1 Introduction 
1.1 Selection of the Topic 
In the Annual Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot (Vis Moot) problem 
of the year 2018–2019 one of the issues was set out as “does the tribunal have the jurisdiction 
and/or the powers under the arbitration agreement to adapt the contract”. It appeared in the oral 
hearings of the moot court competition (at least in those rooms where I was present) that the 
majority of the competitors had not – either by a conscious and well-reasoned, maybe strategic 
choice or by a lack of attention – really separated the issues of jurisdiction and powers in this 
context. Instead, the discussion focused mainly on the question of whether the tribunal had the 
jurisdiction, and if it would be found that it did, it was then considered as an automatic 
consequence that the tribunal could decide the case and give a final award on the merits.  
Some judges acting as arbitrators asked the competitors representing the respondent and making 
the argument against the tribunal’s jurisdiction what would happen if the tribunal found that it 
did not have the jurisdiction; could the claimant then take its claim to a state court? Saying yes 
to this query did not really favour the respondent’s case as it then had to answer a bunch of 
awkward follow-up questions: why would you want some of your disagreements (more 
precisely disputes regarding contract adaptation) to be decided by a court when you have 
specifically agreed on arbitration? Are you saying that you intended to separate different claims 
to different forums causing possible parallel proceedings and doubled costs? Do you have 
doubts about this tribunal’s competency to consider this dispute and adapt your contract 
correctly, and for that reason want the task to be rather entrusted to a court? This examination 
would not of course happen in real life in front of a panel that wants to maintain its neutrality, 
but the point could very well be utilized by the claimant in its counter argumentation thereby 
leaving the tribunal to question the credibility of the respondent’s argumentation.  
Was there another option the respondent could have argued? Could it have credibly said that 
even if the tribunal had the jurisdiction to solve all disputes between the parties, it still did not 
have the powers to adapt the contract? And that therefore if the tribunal refused to hear the case 
on the merits the claimant had to settle with that decision without a chance to take its claim to a 
court? Having tested this argumentation a couple times in the pre-moots, it seemed that the idea 
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of such possibility was a bit strange even to the lawyers practising international arbitration and 
acting as arbitrators in the moot. It did not necessarily get rejected altogether but surely was not 
the easiest-to-sell argument, which led it to be left out from the pleadings before the finals 
(where, again, at least I had to stumble my way through the aforesaid questions not that 
convincingly). After all, the question did not emerge as a very central issue in the Vis Moot but 
was rather a smaller offshoot.  
However, the Vis Moot problem left me pondering the possible distinction that could be drawn 
between jurisdiction and powers which in turn led me to the separation of the concepts of 
jurisdiction and admissibility. Could “powers” as a more general word comprise issues of 
admissibility? As proved out in the Vis Moot, the way we understand the concepts of jurisdiction 
and admissibility has a direct impact on how the parties in arbitration should reason and build 
their cases. It should be defined whether at the particular time it is the jurisdiction or 
admissibility that is challenged. Hereby, it is important that a party has it clear in its mind and 
is able to explain what kind of award it is seeking the arbitral tribunal to give. Does it want the 
tribunal to render an award where it is said (a) that the tribunal is fully authorized to decide the 
case (and thus the tribunal may go on to make a decision on the merits of the case), (b) that it 
does not have the jurisdiction in the matter and thus the case should be heard in a court room 
instead or (c) that the tribunal has the jurisdiction in the dispute but that the claim at hand is 
inadmissible (i.e. not acceptable) and thus cannot be heard at all? The issue subject to this study 
is set out more specifically in the following chapter. 
1.2 Subject of the Study, Structure and Methodology 
The subject of this study is the separation between the concepts of jurisdiction and admissibility 
in international arbitration. Whereas the issues concerning arbitral tribunals’ jurisdiction are in 
the very core of the teachings on arbitration, the possible situations of a claim’s inadmissibility 
are less discussed.1 However, in addition to determining who has the jurisdiction to decide 
disputes between the parties, it is also relevant to understand what the decision-making body is 
                                               
1 For example, the leading studies on international arbitration including Redfern and Hunter on International 
Arbitration and Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration do not refer to admissibility 
as a distinct concept or principle in international arbitration. Also, Gary Born in his study International Commercial 
Arbitration discusses admissibility only in a very limited scope regarding noncompliance with the procedural 
requirements of an arbitration agreement. About admissibility in the legal literature see later Chapter 3.2.3. 
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entitled to do within its jurisdiction. This means finding limits to the arbitral tribunal’s authority 
still in the event that the dispute itself formally falls within the scope of the arbitration 
agreement. In particular, this study aims at solving how claims on contract adaptation should be 
addressed regarding the division of jurisdiction and admissibility. In the light of the above, the 
research questions of this study are the following: 
i. What is the difference between challenges to jurisdiction and challenges to admissibility 
and what is the relevance of their separation? 
ii. Could a claim on contract adaptation be considered inadmissible due to the inadequacy 
of the arbitrators’ powers (or does the issue always pertain to the arbitrators’ 
jurisdiction)? 
This study combines legalistic and theoretical examination. The second chapter first focuses, 
from a largely legalistic perspective, on determining what is contract adaptation and how 
adaptation differs from a more traditional dispute resolution undertaken by arbitral tribunals. 
Secondly, it specifies the possible stands a party may take against a claim on adaptation at the 
different phases of the procedure. The third chapter introduces the concepts of jurisdiction and 
admissibility, with the approach being predominantly legalistic. It adduces the unclarity in the 
use of the concepts in case law and legal literature and clarifies the essential differences between 
challenges to jurisdiction and challenges to admissibility. In the fourth chapter, it is analysed 
from a theoretical standpoint how claims on contract adaptation should be addressed regarding 
their preliminary contestation; whether a claim on adaptation could be dismissed on the grounds 
of inadmissibility or whether the issue pertains exclusively to jurisdiction. The fifth chapter 
concludes.  
1.3 Terminology, Limitations and Materials 
When talking about international arbitration, one is dealing with a wide range of legal rules, 
doctrines and principles that cover different areas of the conduct of the arbitral procedure. As is 
typical with language, sometimes the same words are used to mean different things, and the 
meaning of the term largely depends on the particular context. This is capable of causing 
confusion and misunderstanding. Therefore, some clarifications as to the vocabulary used in this 
study is necessary. 
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Within international arbitration, the word admissibility is perhaps more frequently connected to 
the admissibility of evidence. However, in the context of this study, admissibility refers to the 
admissibility (as in acceptability) of a claim that is brought in a dispute resolution procedure. 
Furthermore, it is important to separate the issue of admissibility from arbitrability, which refers 
to situations where the nature of the subject matter is uncapable of being settled by arbitration 
usually due to public policy limitations.2 It should be noted however that the classification 
between admissibility and arbitrability is not universally accepted. For example, the US 
Supreme court has not followed the separation of the terms arbitrability, admissibility and 
jurisdiction but has used them interchangeably. Such international disharmony indicates even 
greater need for further promotion of linguistic accuracy in this matter. The American use of the 
terminology and the relationship between arbitrability and admissibility are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3.2.2. 
Regarding limitations, this study focuses the first and foremost on international arbitration. 
Therefore, it is not concerned with the national arbitration or contract laws of any particular 
state but focuses primarily on international instruments and legal sources. However, the 
provisions of some national laws as well as domestic case law may be observed for comparative 
and illustrative purposes. Additionally, it is outside the scope of this study to analyse under 
which circumstances an arbitral tribunal is empowered to adapt the parties’ contract i.e. what 
suffices for an authorization for adaptation (which is entirely its own issue that has been subject 
to considerable discussion in legal literature for decades). Thus, this study is not concerned with 
what factors determine whether the tribunal has the authority adapt the contract, but the focus is 
on the possible objections that may be raised against the claim requiring adaptation. In that 
regard, it is analyzed whether the resisting party should focus on proving that the tribunal does 
not have jurisdiction in the dispute or whether it could also reason that the claim is inadmissible.  
There are no sources that would discuss admissibility and arbitrators’ power to adapt contracts 
jointly. Therefore, this study combines sources on jurisdiction and admissibility with sources on 
contract adaptation and aims at creating some relationship between them. The literary materials 
used in this study include firstly the basic studies on international arbitration such as the works 
                                               
2 What is “arbitrable” differs between countries, but non-arbitrable disputes often include for example questions of 
insolvency, personal status, and certain types of intellectual property disputes, that are not considered suitable for 
confidential procedure. See Redfern – Hunter 2015, 586. 
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of Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, W. Laurence Craig, William W. Park and Jan Paulsson, 
Gary B. Born as well as Julian Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis and Stefan Kröll. They have been 
valuable sources especially with regard to the general concepts and principles of international 
arbitration and have hence provided the basis for the comparison between the concepts of 
jurisdiction and admissibility.  
Regarding the more specific consideration on admissibility the major source has been Jan 
Paulsson’s article Jurisdiction and Admissibility. It can be said to be a pioneer writing on the 
separation between jurisdiction and admissibility and has virtually initiated the discussion about 
the topic among other commentators. In addition, with regard to the dimension of contract 
adaptation in this study Klaus Peter Berger’s articles Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and 
Revise Contracts to Make Sense and Renegotiation and Adaption of International Investment 
Contracts: The Role of Contract Drafters and Arbitrators, as well as Lisa Beisteiner’s writing 
The Arbitration Agreement and Arbitrability, The (Perceived) Power of the Arbitrator to Revise 
a Contract – The Austrian Perspective have been of great use. 
Furthermore, in addition to legal literature, both international and domestic case law have 
provided important insight into how courts and arbitral tribunals have recognized the separation 
between jurisdiction and admissibility and regarded the grounds for inadmissibility in practice. 
Notably, however, the case law does not provide that much for the discussion on contract 
adaptation as while there is considerable discussion in the literature, the published case law on 
the topic is sparse.3 The court judgments utilized in this study include decisions from different 
jurisdictions, such as Austria, France, Hongkong, Switzerland, Singapore, the UK and the US, 
as well as from the International Court of Justice.  
The referenced arbitral awards in turn have been given mainly in institutional arbitrations, 
principally in ICC and ICSID proceedings. The reasons for the wide use of ICSID awards are 
that ICSID tribunals have dealt with admissibility issues relatively many times and the awards 
are more often publicly available. Notably, as Berger states, despite the basic differences 
between private arbitration and the investment arbitration system, based on international law 
and largely isolated from the national procedural law, the same question on the jurisdiction of 
                                               
3 See Brunner 2009, 452. 
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the arbitral tribunal to adapt the parties’ contract arises in both areas.4 Therefore, there is no 
reason why they should not be regarded as equally valid sources for the purposes of this study. 
 
 
                                               
4 Berger 2003, 1371. 
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2 Claims on Contract Adaptation 
2.1 What Is Contract Adaptation? 
Especially when agreeing on long-term contracts it is possible and even presumable that the 
circumstances prevailing at the time the contract is concluded will change during the contract 
period.5 The changes in external conditions outside the control of the parties may truly affect 
the performances under the contract and even render the whole deal unbearable for the aggrieved 
party. For example, development of new technology can make the production of the product 
remarkably cheaper or imposition of new state regulation create unpredicted requirements for 
the manufacturer leading to significant additional expenses. As a result, the price stipulated in 
the contract may not at all correspond to the current market price level of the product or service 
subject to the sale. In such occasion, the party suffering from the change in circumstances might 
completely forfeit the commercial basis of the contract but still be bound to perform it for years.  
In order to prevent the costs caused by such unforeseen events from falling entirely on one of 
the parties and thus to avoid the risk of losing their benefits under the contract, the parties may 
agree that in case of a change in circumstances the contract could be adapted. Contract clauses 
of this type are often found especially in long-term supply contracts as well as in investment 
contracts.6 There are variety of different clauses that can provide for adaptation such as hardship 
clauses or specifically adaptation/revision clauses.7 In addition to including a specific clause in 
the contract, the parties can opt for adaptation also by subjecting their agreement to a contract 
law that provides for adaptation.8 For example, the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts, which have the purpose of harmonizing international commercial 
contract law and which the parties can agree to apply to their contract, provide that in case of 
hardship if the parties fail to reach an agreement, the court can adapt the contract with a view to 
restoring its equilibrium.9 Similarly, the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) stipulate 
                                               
5 Fox 2013, 250; Beisteiner 2014a; Berger 2001, 2; Berger 2003, 1348–1349; Ferrario 2017, 71–72; Bordacahar 
2018; Schmitthoff 1980, 415.  
6 Schwenzer – Muñoz 2019, 167; Kröll 2004, 437, 440; Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, 24; Frick 2017, 190; 
Fox 2013, 74, 250; Ferrario 2017, 72; Schmitthoff 1980, 417. 
7 Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 710. About different types of contract clauses enabling adaptation such as automatic 
adaptation clauses, hardship clauses and gap-filling clauses see Kröll 2004, 437–444; see also Fox 2013, 256–257.  
8 Fox 2013, 252. 
9 See Art. 6.2.3(4) of the UNIDROIT Principles. Note that according to Art. 1.11 the word “court” includes also an 
arbitral tribunal. 
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that if the parties fail to reach agreement, the court may adapt the contract in order to distribute 
between the parties in a just and equitable manner the losses and gains resulting from the change 
of circumstances.10 Some commentators are also of the opinion that the CISG regulates hardship 
and provides for the remedy of contract adaptation.11 However, in its complexity the issue is 
unsettled. 
The contract can be adapted in a number of ways. For example, the tribunal may increase or 
decrease the contract price or the extent of a performance obligation, adjust the means or method 
of performance (e.g. by changing the place of performance or the due date) or order a 
compensatory payment or appropriate monetary adjustment.12 The purpose of adaptation is to 
rebalance the parties’ interests in the changed conditions. Adaptation represents the notion of 
clausula rebus sic stantibus which reflects the idea of creating a certain flexibility of the initial 
agreement over its duration in order to maintain the economic balance.13 By adaptation it is 
ensured that the extra costs incurred do not unfairly prejudice one of the parties but that the risk 
is shared.14 However, the objective is not to restore the original equilibrium of the contract but 
to adapt the contract only to the extent that is necessary to make performance bearable for the 
aggrieved party.15 Therefore, the adaptation does not necessarily reflect in full the loss entailed 
by the change in circumstances, but the parties’ mutual risk assumption is to be considered.16 
Neither can the tribunal rewrite the whole contract or oblige the parties to enter into a new 
agreement.17  
Adaptation by a third party is often regarded as a last resort.18 Thus, as a primary or preliminary 
stage the hardship/adaptation clause or the applicable regulation often includes an obligation to 
renegotiate with the other party to find an amicable solution to the situation.19 Through 
                                               
10 See Art. 6:111(3) of the PECL. Like under the UNIDROIT Principles, also under PECL the word “court” includes 
also an arbitral tribunal (Art. 1:301). 
11 See e.g. CISG-AC Opinion No. 7; Schwenzer 2008, 713; Ishida 2018, 372; Brunner 2009, 418–419. Cf. 
Lookofsky 2011, 161–162.  
12 Brunner 2009, 501; Beisteiner 2014b, 90; Lando – Beale 2000, 327. 
13 Berger 2001, 2. 
14 Lando – Beale 2000, 326–327. 
15 Brunner 2009, 499–500. 
16 Comment No. 7 on Art. 6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles; Brunner 2009, 392, 499–500. 
17 Brunner 2009, 501; Lando – Beale 2000, 327. 
18 See Lando – Beale 2000, 324; Frick 2017, 192. 
19 Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, 24; Schmitthoff 1980, 419. For example, the ICC Hardship Clause 2003 
provides that “[…] the parties are bound, within a reasonable time of the invocation of this Clause, to negotiate 
alternative contractual terms which reasonably allow for the consequences of the event”. Similarly, according to 
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negotiations the parties can modify the contract independently if they consider that the aggrieved 
party is entitled to adaptation. However, parties are generally not inclined to agree on how the 
contract should be adapted or whether to adapt it at all.20 They may have strong disagreements 
regarding whether the requirements for adaptation21 are fulfilled in the particular event or how 
much, for example, the price should be increased or decreased. Consequently, a third party 
intervention becomes necessary.22 The third party is generally either a court or an arbitral 
tribunal.23 Of course, the parties can also prefer that their contract cannot be adapted by a third 
party in case the renegotiations fail but instead agree on a different remedy such as termination 
of the contract.24 However, by agreeing on adaptation as the available remedy, the parties give 
up their autonomy to fix the hardship situation by themselves and allow a court or an arbitral 
tribunal to rewrite their contract for them. 
2.2 Contract Adaptation vs. Traditional Dispute Resolution 
Dispute resolution is traditionally understood as the act of adjudicating pre-existing rights.25 
Therefore, it has been argued that interfering with the contract by creating new obligations 
                                               
Art. 6:111(2) of the PECL “the parties are bound to enter into negotiations with a view to adapting the contract or 
terminating it”. Also, the UNIDROIT Principles stipulate under Art. 6.3.2(1) that ”[i]n case of hardship the 
disadvantaged party is entitled to request renegotiations”.  
20 Beisteiner 2014a.  
21 The requirements for adaptation can be for example linked to the existence of hardship. The hardship criteria 
include a certain threshold of onerousness, unforeseeability and the requirement that the event was beyond the 
party’s control. See e.g. ICC Hardship Clause 2003. More about the hardship requirements see e.g. Schwenzer – 
Muñoz 2019, 154–160; Lando – Beale 2000, 324–326; Brunner 2009, 399. 
22 Stalev 1983, 200; Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, 24. 
23 Schwenzer – Muñoz 2019, 167–168. 
24 See Schmitthoff 1980, 421. This is the position taken e.g. in the ICC Hardship Clause 2003 which stipulates that 
“[…] where alternative contractual terms which reasonably allow for the consequences of the event are not agreed 
by the other party to the contract as provided in that paragraph, the party invoking this Clause is entitled to 
termination of the contract”.  
 However, at the time of concluding the contract the parties are often planning long-standing, mutually beneficial 
and flexible relationship and thus want their contract to be rather modified than completely terminated in case the 
circumstances change. Indeed, termination of the contract is not always the suitable solution. According to Stalev, 
“To terminate the contract, as it no longer corresponds to the new circumstances, is not the right solution for long-
term contracts. The well understood interests of both parties require that the disturbed contractual relations be 
stabilized and the contract be saved. In order to save the contract the initial contractual balance must be 
reestablished. It may be reestablished by amending the contract so that it fits the changed circumstances better.” 
Stalev 1983, 199–200.  
 Nevertheless, despite of the constructive idea, it ought to be noted that enforcing an adaptation on disputing 
parties may not solve the parties’ conflict but instead just force them to remain in a continuing hostile relationship. 
Schwenzer – Muñoz 2019, 168. 
25 Beisteiner 2014a; Brunner 2009, 494; Ferrario 2017, 145; see Schmitthoff 1980, 415–416. 
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through adaptation would not at all fall under the perception of arbitration.26 The reasoning is 
that arbitrators can only resolve “legal disputes”, and as a request for adaptation does not allege 
a breach or non-performance of a contractual or legal duty, is not a dispute in that sense.27 For 
example, the Austrian Supreme Court held in its ruling of 1985 that the adaptation of a long-
term contract to changed circumstances on the basis of the respective contractual clause would 
not be arbitration, but rather expert determination.28 This “dispute oriented” understanding of 
arbitration, as Berger calls it, has been visible also in the context of investment arbitration.29 
During the drafting of the UNCITRAL Model Law30, it was suggested that regarding matters 
sufficient to arbitration a more lenient formulation would be adopted, according to which the 
existence of “difference” of opinion would suffice for an arbitration agreement, 31 which would 
allow arbitrators also to decide cases on adaptation. Conversely, it was also adduced that 
arbitrators’ tasks would be limited to the interpretation and application of contracts and legal 
provisions.32 Lastly the suggestion of the broader wording of “difference” was rejected by the 
UNCITRAL Working Group, and the Art. 7(1) of the Model Law now defines arbitration 
agreement as an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which 
have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship.  
Already in 1985 René David argued that the strict distinction between the two kinds of decision-
making should be given up. He pursued the idea of oneness of arbitration i.e. a uniform concept 
of arbitration which would comprise both traditional dispute settlement and contract adaptation. 
In his view, in both cases the same technique is resorted to, the same result is aimed at, and the 
application of same rules is desirable.33 Indeed, the approach according to which a disagreement 
about whether a contract should be adapted is not a “dispute” and thereby not sufficient to 
                                               
26 Berger 2003, 1373–1376; Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, 25; Brunner 2009, 493–494; Beisteiner 2014b, 
84–85; Bernardini 1998, 421–422; Kröll 2004, 450. 
27 Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, 25; Beisteiner 2014b, 84–85; Kröll 2004, 450. 
28 OGH, docket number 1 Ob 504/85 (1985), cited in Beisteiner 2014b, 85. 
29 See Berger 2003, 1374–1375. During the drafting of the ICSID Convention, the chairman of the Legal Committee 
was of the opinion that that differences of opinion of the parties on contractual adjustment could not be regarded 
as “disputes”. See ICSID Doc. SID/LC/SR/4 (1964), 3. 
30 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration with amendments (2006). 
31 UN Doc.AICN.9/WG.IIIWP.37. 
32 By the German delegation. See the statement of die German delegation during the drafting of the Model Law in 
UN Doc. A/CN.9/26*3, para. 15: “the activity of die arbitral tribunal is concentrated on die interpretation and 
application of contractual agreements and legal provisions”. 
33 David 1985, 411. 
11 
 
arbitration, is very conceptual and artificial. Firstly, if the parties disagree on, for example, 
whether one of the parties is entitled to price increase under the hardship clause or how much 
the price should be increased, it sounds strange to claim that there would not be a dispute and 
consequently the parties could not have the matter solved by the arbitrators.34 It is another 
question, of course, whether the parties in that particular case have granted the tribunal the 
authority to adapt their agreement. However, the point here is that they should have been at least 
able to do so if they wished. 
Secondly, the separation between adaptation and interpretation of a contract is not always clear 
or even feasible.35 Thus, it would be practically impossible to classify and divide the matters 
that do or do not suffice to arbitration. For example, if the parties have drafted a price revision 
clause, it is not uncomplicated to define whether increasing the price on the basis of that clause 
is adaptation of the contract or simply enforcement of the price revision clause. The situations 
vary regarding to what degree the result is up to the tribunal’s discretion and to what extent it is 
determined by the parties’ contract which the tribunal is “only” interpreting and applying.36 
Therefore, quibbling over which difference or conflict between the parties is or is not a dispute, 
and drawing lines between situations that are or are not adaptation would only lead to growing 
unclarity. 
It seems that today this notion has been generally accepted, and arbitration and the role of 
arbitrators are considered relatively broadly.37 It has been considered that the narrow 
interpretation does not reflect the practice or the needs of modern international commerce38 and 
                                               
34 Similarly, according to Szurski “[i]t may be assumed that in the case the parties to a contract, acting in virtue of 
contractual provisions, cannot come to an agreement as to the adaptation of the contract to substantially changed 
circumstances or as to the filling the “gap” in it, there exists between them a dispute on this matter. If the parties 
have agreed between themselves that disputes of such kind are subject to decision by means of arbitration, the 
competence of the arbitral tribunal to give a decision in the form of award on the disputed subject matter cannot be 
questioned.” Szurski 1984, 67–68. 
35 Berger 2001, 6; Horn 1985, 184; Beisteiner 2014b, 88 (“any distinction between interpreting and creating the 
law can be only fiction”); see Mann 1990, 259; see also Aminoil v. Kuwait (1982), para. 75. 
36 About different types of contract clauses enabling adaptation such as automatic adaptation clauses, hardship 
clauses and gap-filling clauses see Kröll 2004, 437–444; see also Fox 2013, 256–257. 
37 Berger 2001, 15; Brunner 2009, 496; Beisteiner 2014b, 105–106; Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, 28; 
Bernardini 1998, 422; Frick 2001, 194. Some jurisdictions have even adopted statutes that expressly recognize that 
the parties are entitled to agree to empower the arbitral tribunal to fill gaps or to adapt the contract. See e.g. Art. 
1(2) of the Bulgarian Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1993); Art. 1020(4)(c) of the Dutch Arbitration 
Act (1986); Section 1 of the Swedish Arbitration Act (1999). 
38 Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, 25; Berger 2003, 1375 et seqq.; Brower 2016, 17; see Brunner 2009, 496.  
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that arbitration proceedings in which arbitrators may not only compensate or excuse parties but 
also to modify contracts are much more capable of solving problems early and in a manner 
which facilitates further cooperation of the parties.39 The factors that have been said to have 
promoted the recognition of contract adaptation within the authority of arbitrators include the 
significantly greater arbitration-friendliness of national arbitration acts, increased equal 
treatment of adjudication by arbitral tribunals and by national courts, and the comprehensive 
recognition of party-autonomy as the leading principle of arbitration.40 It should be pointed out 
that neither the drafters of the Model Law, regardless of the choice in favour of the word 
“dispute” in Art. 7(2), opted for excluding the possibility of contract adaptation by arbitral 
tribunals. Instead, it was considered during the negotiations that due to the complexity of 
problems relating to adaptation of contracts, the matter should be left to be governed by the 
national laws, which were encouraged to adopt rules on adjustment of contracts.41 
However, although the modern developments have rightly led to the acceptance of adaptation 
as arbitration, the observation that should be made herein is that contract adaptation still is to a 
considerable extent different kind of decision-making than settling a traditional dispute.42 
Indeed, the power to adapt a contract is of a distinct nature from the more conventional, merely 
declarative powers of the tribunal (or a court) which involve interpreting the contract in an exact 
manner, determining its existence or inexistence, or deciding whether it was properly performed 
or avoided.43 When a party requests adaptation of the contract, the tribunal is no longer being 
asked to make a “yes or no” decision on the basis of that contract but rather to shape the 
                                               
 Empowering arbitrators to adapt a contract has been considered possible also in the context of investment 
arbitration. However, a clear and explicit wording for that is required. In Aminoil v. Kuwait (1982) the tribunal 
submitted that “[a] tribunal cannot substitute itself for the parties in order to make good a missing segment of their 
contractual relations – or to modify a contract – unless that right is conferred upon it by law, or by the express 
consent of parties” (para. 74). 
39 Frick 2017, 190. 
40 Berger 2003, 1375–1376. 
41 It was considered that national legislators should first adopt rules on adaptation of contracts or improve the 
already existing rules considering the needs of modern international trade. Once the rules in this field and the 
practice on the basis of such rules would be more developed, a harmonization could be more easily achieved. UN 
Doc. A/CN.9/245, para. 23. 
42 Berger 2003, 1379; Beisteiner 2014b, 116–117; Kröll 2004, 451. Cf. Brunner 2009, 496–497, where Brunner 
submits that as the request for modification needs to be reasonably substantiated by the parties, the outcome of the 
adaptation process by the tribunal is not so open that it would not be suited to classical arbitral adjudication in the 
sense of a “yes or no” decision. Thus, Brunner’s argument in support of the possibility of contract adaptation in 
arbitration is based on the apprehension that in fact adaptation is not so different from the traditional “yes or no” 
decision-making. 
43 Kos – Durbas 2014, 135. 
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contractual relationship for the parties.44 By adapting the contract, the tribunal may indeed 
modify the parties’ rights and obligations as well as create new obligations upon its discretion, 
and therefore the decision-making includes a creative or innovative element in substitution of 
determining the parties’ rights and obligations through mere interpretation and application of 
the contract.45  
By letting the tribunal to adapt their agreement, the parties give up their autonomy to control 
and regulate the contractual relationship and agree to be bound by the decision the tribunal finds 
most suitable in the situation. Although the tribunal’s discretion is not unlimited, it is however 
wider than when determining the parties’ rights and obligations through a traditional dispute 
settlement.46 Thus, it is often also more difficult to predict the outcome of the procedure.47 As a 
consequence of the tribunal’s greater discretion, there is also an obvious difference in the degree 
of competence required from the arbitrators.48 When adapting a contract, the tribunal often needs 
to, in addition to the expertise in the legal area, have competence also in for example the 
economic, financial or technical field in order to reach a sensible solution.49 Therefore, it is not 
self-evident that the parties always want the tribunal to possess such powers even though they 
would want it to solve their disputes through traditional dispute settlement i.e. interpretation and 
application of the agreement.50 
2.3 The Possible Stands Against a Claim on Contract Adaptation 
After the circumstances have changed, the parties may disagree on whether the contract can be 
adapted to reflect those changes. The disagreement may concern whether the contract can be 
adapted by the arbitral tribunal and thus whether the tribunal possesses such authority and/or 
whether the aggrieved party is entitled to the requested adaptation on the basis of the applicable 
                                               
44 Berger 2003, 1373. 
45 Berger 2003, 1372, 1379; Beisteiner 2014b, 78, 84; Redfern – Hunter 2004, 363; see Fouchard – Gaillard – 
Goldman 1999, 27. 
46 See Stalev 1983, 206. 
47 When applying a contract clause or regulation that allows also termination of the contract, it is also left to the 
tribunal’s consideration whether to adapt the contract at all or whether it is more suitable to terminate it entirely. 
See Lando – Beale 2000, 326–327. 
48 Berger 2001, 12. 
49 Berger 2001, 12. 
50 Similarly, Stalev 1983, 200 (“To empower a third person to write a contract – especially a long-term contract for 
international economic cooperation – is a risky undertaking. No wonder the parties would be very reluctant to give 
such a power.”). 
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substantive law and the facts of the particular case.51 Due to the above-discussed singular nature 
of contract adaptation and to protect its own interests, the party whose performance is not 
affected by the changed circumstances may have good reasons to resist the adaptation. At this 
point, it is important to recognize what type of challenges the party can raise i.e. what are the 
conceivable positions against the claim requesting contract adaptation. 
First, a separation is to be made between an objection on the procedural grounds and again on 
the merits of the case. When determining whether the contract can be adapted by the tribunal, 
the aspects of substantive and procedural law are closely intertwined.52 This problem was 
realized during the drafting of the Model Law when insertion of a provision on contract 
adaptation was considered. The provision was ultimately omitted as it was considered that “it 
was difficult to separate questions pertaining to procedural law and questions pertaining to 
substantive law and that, therefore, the Model Law, as a system of procedural rules, should not 
contain rules which might touch upon substantive rights of the parties”.53 The entanglement of 
the procedural and substantive aspects is reflected, for example, in the fact that the inclusion of 
a contract clause in the substantive agreement that may require adaptation during the contract 
term or submitting the agreement to a substantive law that permits adaptation may entail that 
the tribunal is granted also with the procedural powers to adapt the agreement.54 However, even 
if the sources of substantive law have to be referred to when determining whether the tribunal 
has the authority to adapt the agreement, the question of the existence of such mandate still is 
of procedural nature.55 
The objection on the merits is typically considered after the tribunal has already found that it is 
procedurally competent in the case.56 By objecting the adaptation only on the level of the 
                                               
51 See Beisteiner 2014b, 79. 
52 Beisteiner 2014b, 78–79; Berger 2001, 7; Brunner 2009, 494; see Frick 2017, 194. 
53 UN Doc. A/CN.9/245, para. 21. It was also considered that contract adaptation would not be acceptable for many 
countries, and therefore a specific provision was left out from the Model Law. 
54 Beisteiner 2014b, 110; Berger 2001, 8; see Brunner 2009, 495, 497; ICC Award No. 5754 (unpublished) cited in 
Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 90. In ICC case 5754 (1988) the tribunal held that the traditional ICC arbitration 
clause may be interpreted as covering the adaptation of contracts if the clause is contained in a long-term contract 
that contains “a number of provisions which may require adjustment over the period of that contract”.  
55 Indeed, as Berger puts it, “[e]ven if […] the applicable substantive law permits an adjustment by third parties, 
the question remains whether arbitral tribunals are procedurally authorized to make such decisions”. Berger 2003, 
1373. Also, Brunner submits that “[c]onceptually, the procedural issue as to whether the lex arbitri allows arbitral 
tribunals to adapt a contract must be distinguished from the question as to whether the applicable substantive law 
(lex causae) allows for such a remedy”. Brunner 2009, 494. Similarly, Frick 2017, 194. 
56 Beisteiner 2014b, 79. 
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substantive law the party implies that it recognizes the tribunal’s procedural authority to decide 
the claim and consequently also adapt it if it considers adaptation appropriate. On the merits the 
party’s contestation can be based on, for example, an allegation that the parties have not 
provided for adaptation as the available remedy or that the requirements for adaptation are not 
fulfilled in the particular case. The questions the tribunal needs to deal with at this point navigate 
around the two competing principles of the sanctity of contracts (pacta sunt servanda) and 
change of circumstances (clausula rebus sic stantibus).57 Finally, at the end of the arbitral 
procedure the tribunal renders a final award which cannot be subsequently reviewed by courts. 
Whereas resisting the claim on a substantive ground challenges the opposing party’s right to the 
requested adaptation, raising an objection on a procedural ground questions whether the tribunal 
is in the first place entitled to decide the case. Thus, the tribunal is asked to render a decision 
where it finds that it does not have the competence to adapt the contract or to even examine 
whether the contract should be adapted or not. At this stage, depending on the objecting party’s 
arguments, the tribunal may have to determine whether contract adaptation still (subject to the 
applicable laws) qualifies as arbitration (a question of arbitrability), and if so, whether under the 
individual arbitration agreement the tribunal is authorized to adapt the contract (a question of 
procedural powers in the particular case).58 In this regard, the tribunal’s procedural powers could 
be objected, for example, on the basis that the applicable arbitration law (the lex arbitri) does 
not allow arbitrators to adapt contracts or that the lex arbitri requires an express authorization 
for that regard which the parties have not given.59 
Second, in addition to the division between the aspects of substantive law and procedural law, 
attention should be drawn to the character of the preliminary contestation. As explained above, 
                                               
57 Beisteiner 2014b, 79; for a comparative analysis of the application of these principles see Frick 2017, 205 et 
seqq. 
58 Beisteiner 2014b, 79. 
59 Arguments could be developed for and against these positions. For example, Berger submits that “[u]sually, the 
traditional terminology that 'all disputes arising out of or in connection with this dispute' are referred to arbitration 
suffices to invest an international arbitral tribunal with a decision-making power that covers all aspects of possible 
disputes. The situation is different with respect to the adaptation and supplementation of contracts. Here, the 
perceived contractual and creative nature of the arbitrator's decision is said to require a specific contract clause that 
contains an express authorization by the parties in addition to the usual arbitration agreement”. Berger 2001, 8. 
Conversely, the Swiss Supreme Court has held that as long as the arbitration agreement does not contain any 
express restrictions, it must be assumed that the parties intended to confer upon the tribunal an all-embracing 
jurisdiction, including the power to fill gaps and amend the contract. NV Belgische v. NV Distrigas (2001), 
referenced in Nessi 2017 and Brunner 2009, 357, fn. 82. 
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this study focuses, from the facet of contract adaptation, on the separation of the issues of 
jurisdiction and admissibility. Traditionally all procedural/preliminary challenges to the 
tribunal’s powers to adapt a contract has been presumed to be concerned with the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.60 However, this study challenges that view and examines whether the preliminary 
contestation in cases of contract adaptation by arbitrators could also (or should rather) be 
regarded as an issue pertaining to admissibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – The different positions available for the party resisting adaptation of the contract. 
 
Here (see Figure 1) the challenges to admissibility of claims are located under procedural 
matters together with jurisdictional challenges. This is because they both are preliminary 
objections and if they succeed the tribunal is prevented from making a finding on the merits of 
the case.61 One could argue that the nature of admissibility questions is substantive rather than 
procedural because the claim’s admissibility is decided after the tribunal has already found that 
it has the jurisdiction to decide the case, and thus the tribunal has the procedural mandate to 
proceed further in the case and give a final decision on admissibility and/or on the merits. In 
                                               
60 See later Chapter 4.2.2. 
61 Lim – Ho – Paparinskis 2018, 121; Waibel 2014, 7; Walters 2012, 661; Fitzmaurice 1986, 438. 
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addition, admissibility is often closely related to the substantive side of the dispute. Then again, 
as was demonstrated above, neither can the legal aspects that are generally understood as 
procedural be wholly distinguished from the substantive matters, at least in cases of contract 
adaptation. Whether the admissibility questions pertain to procedural or substantive field of the 
arbitral procedure will be discussed in more detail later in Chapter 3.4.3. At this stage, it is safe 
to settle for characterising the challenges of admissibility as preliminary objections rather than 
either procedural or substantive. 
Determining the difference between jurisdiction and admissibility and placing preliminary 
challenges against claims on contract adaptation into that division is probably even more 
complex than making a separation between the aspects of substantive and procedural law. This 
is because the division between jurisdiction and admissibility is not even itself very clear and 
widely taken notice of but instead situations of admissibility are often mixed with jurisdictional 
issues. Furthermore, the availability of the arbitrators’ powers to adapt a contract has 
presumably never been considered in relation to admissibility and thus explicitly regarded as an 
issue pertaining to the admissibility of the particular claim. However, the question is of 
considerable practical relevance. The nature of the preliminary contestation affects, for example, 
what kind of award the tribunal is practically supposed to render, the possibility of a subsequent 
review of the award by state courts and the possibilities for referring the claim to litigation if 
the arbitral proceedings are ceased. Before examining in detail the appropriate classification of 
the preliminary challenges against claims on adaptation, I will first analyse in general the 
difference between the concepts of jurisdiction and admissibility. 
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3 Challenges to Jurisdiction vs. Challenges to Admissibility 
3.1 Introduction 
Understanding the separation between the concepts of jurisdiction and admissibility is not only 
of theoretical relevance but serves a significant practical purpose.62 The essentiality of the 
separation is well summarized by Jan Paulsson who explains that if the arbitral tribunal’s 
decision exceeds the limits of its jurisdiction, the decision can be invalidated by a controlling 
authority, whereas if the parties have consented to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, any decision of 
that tribunal regarding admissibility of the claim is final.63 Hence, if an issue of jurisdiction is 
inaccurately treated as a one of admissibility, the parties are derived from the possibility to get 
the decision reviewed by a court. The other way around, i.e. if an issue of admissibility is 
mistaken for jurisdictional, the faulty classification may result in “an unjustified extension of 
the scope for challenging awards and frustrate the parties’ expectation that their dispute be 
decided by the chosen neutral tribunal”.64 
However, regardless of the direct consequences following the classification of the issues, many 
courts and tribunals have repeatedly mixed the concepts with each other. Particularly, 
admissibility situations are, perhaps due to their obscurity, often treated as jurisdictional issues. 
From the outset it may indeed seem that the difference between the concepts is not that vital or 
that it should not be made at all. After all, in both situations the arbitral tribunal refrains from 
dealing with the merits on the basis of a preliminary impediment to hear the case. However, if 
we take a closer look at the consequences of the tribunal’s decision depending on whether the 
resolved issue is classified as a matter of jurisdiction or admissibility, the difference is integral.  
Therefore, the need for increasing clarity to the distinction between jurisdiction and 
admissibility is evident. Recognizing the differing characteristics of both issues and 
incorporating them stronger to the teachings of international arbitration would develop a more 
coherent practice among courts and tribunals and thus promote clarity and predictability in the 
decision making. It would also help parties to target their defence precisely to that particular 
                                               
62 Paulsson 2005, 601; Douglas 2009, 141; Shany 2013, 786; Gouiffès – Ordonez 2015, 108; Swissbourgh v. 
Lesotho (2018), para. 208. 
63 Paulsson 2005, 601. 
64 Paulsson 2005, 601; similarly, see Gouiffès – Ordonez 2015, 108. 
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legal matter they attempt to evoke, and therefore benefit them when making strategic choices 
and reasoning their positions during the arbitral proceedings. 
3.2 Unclarity in the Use of Concepts 
3.2.1 Lack of Regulatory Recognition of Admissibility 
Admissibility is not expressly recognised in most regulations in the area of international 
arbitration. The terms admissibility and inadmissibility do not appear, for example, in the 
provisions of national arbitration laws, most institutional arbitration rules65, the ICSID 
Convention66 or ICSID Arbitration Rules.67 The lack of an express term has caused especially 
some ICSID tribunals to wholly question the meaning and usefulness of a separate notion of 
admissibility. For example, the tribunals in CMS v. Argentina and in Enron v. Argentina held 
that the distinction between admissibility and jurisdiction does not appear necessary or 
appropriate in the context of ICSID as the Convention deals only with jurisdiction and 
competence.68 Thus, the lack of express recognition in the regulatory framework explains at 
least to some extent the unfamiliarity with or indifference to admissibility also in the practical 
life.69 
                                               
65 Such as the UNCITRAL Rules, the LIAC Rules, the SIAC Rules, the AAA Rules and the FAI Rules. 
66 It can, however, be argued that Art. 41(2) of the ICSID Convention introduces the distinction between jurisdiction 
and admissibility. The article provides that any objection by a party to the dispute that that dispute is not within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre, or for other reasons is not within the competence of the tribunal, shall be considered by 
the tribunal which shall determine whether to deal with it as a preliminary question or to join it to the merits of the 
dispute. See Waibel 2014, 6. Heiskanen suggests that the term “compentence” in Art. 41 would comprehend also 
admissibility and that no strict conceptual distinction can be drawn between the concepts and thus decisions on 
competence are decisions on admissibility and vice versa. Heiskanen 2014, 245.  
 Also, Paulsson submits that as Art. 52 of the ICSID Convention mandates annulment of awards for excess of 
power, it becomes necessary to understand the difference between objections that are finally decided by the 
arbitrators and objections subject to review. Paulsson 2005, 608. 
67 Nota 2010, 31; Newcombe 2010; Waibel 2014, 8; Gouiffès – Ordonez 2015, 111. See BAZ v. BBA (2018), para. 
128, where it was noted that “[i]n international law, the term “admissibility” is expressly mentioned in the Art 79(1) 
of the Rules of the International Court of Justice (1978)” leading to the impression that the ICJ rules are the only 
regulation expressly recognizing admissibility. 
68 CMS v. Argentina (2003), para. 41; Enron v. Argentina (2004), para. 33. Similarly, in Methanex v. USA (2002) 
the tribunal rejected the USA’s admissibility challenges because it found that due to the absence of an equivalent 
rule on admissibility it had no express or implied power to reject claims based on inadmissibility (paras. 123–126). 
 Nevertheless, the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility has still been recognized also by ICSID 
tribunals. For example, in SGS Société Générale v. Philippines the tribunal held that “[t]his impediment, based as 
it is on the principle that a party to a contract cannot claim on that contract without itself complying with it, is more 
naturally considered as a matter of admissibility than jurisdiction” (para. 154). Consequently, the tribunal ceased 
the proceedings on the basis of the claim’s inadmissibility. 
69 See Gouiffès – Ordonez 2015, 110. 
20 
 
However, as an exemption from what seems to be the more conventional approach, some 
institutional arbitration rules do mention admissibility, which implies awareness and recognition 
of the concept in international commercial arbitration. For example, Art. 6(4) of the ICC Rules 
states that the Court’s decision pursuant to Art. 6(4) is without prejudice to the admissibility or 
merits of any party’s plea or pleas. Similarly, the HKIAC Rules provide in Art. 19.6 that 
HKIAC’s decision pursuant to Art. 19.5 is without prejudice to the admissibility or merits of 
any party’s claim or defence. Additionally, also the SCC Rules submit under Art. 39(2) that a 
request for summary procedure may concern issues of jurisdiction, admissibility or the merits.  
The distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility is noted also in Art. 79 of the ICJ’s Rules 
of Court. The article enables the court to determine the questions of its jurisdiction and the 
admissibility of the application separately. However, since decisions made by the ICJ are not 
subject to any kind of review but the ICJ is a forum of first and last resort, any distinction it 
draws between jurisdiction and admissibility does not have the same significance as in 
arbitration where decisions regarding the tribunal’s jurisdiction are subject to review by national 
courts.70 Therefore, although the ICJ’s determinations of admissibility may be helpful and work 
as guidance, invoking arguments in arbitral proceedings based on the jurisprudence of the ICJ 
should be made with caution.71 
3.2.2 Inaccuracy in Case Law  
The positions taken in case law have been relatively inconsistent regarding the recognition of 
the separation between jurisdiction and admissibility. The line between the concepts does not 
seem to be clear for many tribunals and courts, and in particular issues of admissibility have 
often been mistakenly considered as jurisdictional. Within arbitration the concepts have been 
used inaccurately in both commercial and investment arbitration. However, the difficulty to 
recognise and establish the line between jurisdiction and admissibility becomes even more 
apparent in national courts where distinction is not ordinarily made between the concepts. This 
is because a review is commonly available regardless of whether the decision of the lower court 
is deemed to have related to a matter of jurisdiction or one of admissibility.72  
                                               
70 Paulsson 2005, 603; Newcombe 2010. 
71 Paulsson 2005, 603; Newcombe 2010. 
72 Synková 2012, 39; Paulsson 2005, 603. 
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In many cases admissibility has not been addressed at all either by the court/tribunal or by the 
parties, but the issue has been by default considered to concern jurisdiction. For example, in 
International Research v. Lufthansa, the Singaporean court had to determine whether a multi-
tiered dispute resolution clause including condition precedents to arbitration was enforceable, 
and thus whether the arbitral tribunal had correctly found that it had jurisdiction as it had held 
the preconditions to be unenforceable. The court disagreed with the tribunal’s conclusion as it 
stated that “until the condition precedent to the commencement of arbitration is fulfilled, neither 
party to the arbitration agreement is obliged to participate in the arbitration. In the same vein, 
an arbitral tribunal would not have jurisdiction before the condition precedent is fulfilled”.73 
Thus, the court and previously also the tribunal treated the issue as jurisdictional without even 
considering whether it would in fact be about admissibility. Indeed, a correct approach in the 
case would have been that the party resisting jurisdiction would have rather/also objected the 
claim’s admissibility and that the tribunal would have determined the issue to concern 
admissibility.74 Consequently, the tribunal should have made a decision on whether the non-
fulfillment of the condition precedents rendered the claim inadmissible. That decision would 
not have been then reviewable by the court. 
In turn, in ICC case 12739 the tribunal held that prior to the completion of the pre-arbitral phase 
as foreseen in the arbitration agreement the request for arbitration was inadmissible. However, 
even though the tribunal correctly defined the request inadmissible, it anyway concluded that 
there was no jurisdiction to hear the case as the request was filed prematurely.75 Thereby, the 
tribunal regrettably mixed the two concepts and did not consider them as two separate issues 
with different consequences. This demonstrates that the choice of words used in arbitral awards 
cannot be taken as very intentional but rather even incidental or random. 
In Consorzio Groupement v. Algeria, the ICSID tribunal first correctly noted that “it emerges 
that the Tribunal must first rule on questions affecting its jurisdiction […], and subsequently on 
those relating to admissibility […]. The two types of objections must be dealt with separately 
and successively, because they deal with different questions”.76 Nevertheless, confusingly the 
                                               
73 Emphasis added. International Research v. Lufthansa, para. 101 et seq. 
74 About why non-compliance with procedural preconditions to arbitration should be regarded as an issue of 
admissibility see Chapter 3.4.1. 
75 ICC case 12739 of 2004 (unreported) in Webster – Buhler 2014, 89. 
76 Consorzio Groupement v. Algeria (2005), para. 2. 
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tribunal still ended up concluding that because the claimant was not the holder of the rights and 
obligations of the contract under which the investment was made and thus was not an investor 
within the meaning of the ICSID Convention it followed that the request for arbitration was 
inadmissible, but that also (for the same reason) the tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the 
claim.77 However, in order to correctly follow the distinction between the jurisdiction and 
admissibility challenges the tribunal should have first considered the question of its jurisdiction 
through and consequently, as it would have found to lack jurisdiction, refrained from 
considering the admissibility question at all. Indeed, if the tribunal lacked jurisdiction, it would 
not have been competent to consider the admissibility either. 
A good example of a situation where arbitrators and a court did not understand the nature of the 
preliminary objection similarly is provided by BG Group v. Argentina. In that case the tribunal 
had made a decision as to the admissibility of the claimant’s claims.78 In the award the issue 
was discussed under the heading “Are BG’s Claims Admissible?” and the tribunal concluded 
expressly that it “finds admissible the claims brought by BG in this arbitration”.79 However, 
when Argentina brought the case to the US Court of Appeals, the Court held that the pre-
arbitration litigation requirement was a jurisdictional requirement and that compliance with that 
requirement was reviewable on a de novobasis in a vacatur proceeding. The Court accepted the 
appeal and vacated the award on the basis that the tribunal was without power to hear the case. 
Subsequently, the matter was brought before the US Supreme Court which also considered that 
the matter concerned jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the arbitrators’ jurisdictional 
determinations were lawful and thereby the judgement of Court of Appeals to the contrary is to 
be reversed.80 However, regardless of arriving at different conclusions, both courts ignored that 
the tribunal had in fact made a decision to admissibility but regarded without any 
problematization that the decision was about jurisdiction thus subject to their review.81 
Similarly, in Vekoma v. Maran Coal the parties’ arbitration clause required that any arbitration 
must be initiated within thirty days after it was agreed that the difference or dispute cannot be 
                                               
77 Consorzio Groupement v. Algeria, paras. 40–41. 
78 The issue was whether the claimant’s noncompliance with the requirement under the bilateral investment treaty 
between the UK and Argentina to have prior recourse to local courts for a period of 18 months before arbitration 
could be commenced rendered the claims inadmissible. 
79 BG Group v. Argentina (arbitral award, 2007), para. 157, see also paras. 140 et seqq. 
80 BG Group v. Argentina (Supreme Court judgement, 2014), 19. 
81 Similarly, see Born 2014, 939–941; see also Rau 2014, 12 et seqq. 
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resolved by negotiation. A dispute arose, and arbitration was initiated. The parties disagreed on 
whether the thirty-day limitation was exceeded and thus whether the claimant’s right to arbitrate 
the claim had lapsed. The ICC tribunal held that the claim was timely and consequently rendered 
an award on the merits in favor of the claimant. Afterwards the respondent sought annulment of 
the award in the Swiss Federal Supreme Court which upheld the challenge on the grounds that 
the arbitral tribunal had “erroneously held that it had jurisdiction” by ruling that the claim has 
been brought within the agreed time limit.82 The error of the court’s annulment was that the 
court misunderstood the nature of the challenged arbitral decision; it treated the decision as 
jurisdictional whereas the arbitrators had in fact made a decision as to the admissibility of the 
claim.83 Thus, the court would not have been entitled to review the decision.84  
In addition to the difficulty to separate jurisdiction and admissibility, another stumbling block 
for at least one court has been confusing issues of admissibility with the merits of the case. In 
Methanex v. USA the USA raised a series of objections to both jurisdiction and admissibility. 
Regarding its admissibility challenges, the USA submitted that “taking all of the allegations of 
fact made to be true, including uncontested facts, that as a matter of law, there can be no claim, 
and that the claim is ripe for dismissal at this stage for that reason”.85 The ICSID tribunal 
correctly took the view that the challenge raised by the USA was not jurisdictional. However, it 
has been argued that the tribunal should have also declared that the challenge was not an 
objection of inadmissibility either as it required consideration of the matter of law which would 
preclude the claim.86 Indeed, the defences that the case is unhearable (i.e. inadmissible) should 
be separated from the defences claiming that the case is legally hopeless.87  
Finally, another unfortunate misuse of terminology has been adopted by the US Supreme Court 
which has addressed issues of jurisdiction and admissibility by exercising the term arbitrability.  
According to the prevailing international understanding, arbitrability involves determining 
which types of subjects or disputes are under a particular national law capable of being resolved 
                                               
82 Synková 2012, 39–40. 
83 Paulsson 2005, 602. 
84 Paulsson 2005, 602. 
85 Methanex v. USA (2002), para. 109. 
86 See Paulsson 2005, 607. Ultimately, the tribunal rejected the USA’s admissibility challenges because it found 
that it had no express or implied power to reject claims based on inadmissibility. It submitted that thus it is 
unnecessary to develop these materials further. See Methanex v. USA, para. 126. 
87 Paulsson 2005, 607. 
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in arbitration.88 Thus, it has a very specific meaning and purpose in addressing situations that 
may not be arbitrated regardless of whether the parties have validly agreed to arbitrate such 
matters.89 However, the US courts have adversely confused the term with admissibility and 
jurisdiction thus blurring the lines between the three essentially different concepts.90 For 
example, in First Options v. Kaplan there was a question regarding whether First Options could 
pursue the Kaplans as private persons as well as their firm when the Kaplans were not itself 
signatories to the document containing the arbitration clause. The Court regrettably 
characterized the issue as of arbitrability and held that the dispute was not arbitrable, when it in 
fact was about jurisdiction.91  
In turn, in Glass v. Kidder Peabody the US Court of Appeals mixed arbitrability with 
admissibility as it considered that “questions of mere delay, laches, statute of limitations, and 
untimeliness raised to defeat the compelled arbitration are issues of procedural arbitrability 
exclusively reserved for resolution by the arbitrator”.92 This conclusion was confirmed by the 
US Supreme Court in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds. In that case the issue concerned 
whether Howsam could arbitrate the dispute when the applicable arbitration provision stated 
that the dispute would have to be submitted to arbitration within the time limit of six years after 
the dispute had arisen, and also who should decide such question of “arbitrability”. The Court 
held that the arbitrability issue should be decided by the arbitrators rather than the courts. 
However, the court should have arrived at its conclusion by submitting that the issue was about 
admissibility and for that reason exclusively subject to arbitral determination.93  
3.2.3 Inaccuracy in Literature Contributions 
In addition to the lack of comprehensive regulatory recognition and inaccuracies in case law, 
also the legal literature sometimes seems to further hinder the recognition of admissibility as a 
separate issue from jurisdiction. As an indication of the limited weight and recognition given to 
admissibility, the leading studies on international commercial arbitration (such as Redfern and 
Hunter on International Arbitration and Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International 
                                               
88 Born 2014, 944; Redfern – Hunter 2015, 110; Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 187–188. 
89 Both the New York Convention (Arts. II(1) and V(2)(a)) and the Model Law (Arts. 34(2)(b)(i) and 36(1)(b)(i)) 
deal with non-arbitrable matters and are limited to disputes that are “capable of settlement by arbitration”. 
90 About the analysis and critique of the American use of the word “arbitrability” see Paulsson 2005, 609 et seqq. 
91 Paulsson 2005, 612. 
92 Emphasis added. Glass v. Kidder Peabody (1997), para. 456, cited also in Born 2014, 941, fn. 1604.  
93 Paulsson 2005, 612. 
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Commercial Arbitration) do not seem to refer to admissibility as a distinct concept or principle 
in international arbitration.94 Indeed, usually when scholars address arbitrators’ authority to do 
something within the limits of the powers conferred upon them, the issue is discussed merely in 
the context of jurisdiction. Thus, situations properly classified as matters of admissibility are 
mistakenly equated to jurisdictional. This is capable of hampering the recognition of 
admissibility as an independent concept in arbitration and further confusing the line between 
situations of admissibility and jurisdiction. 
For example, in Redfern and Hunter on International Commercial Arbitration it is stated under 
the title “Jurisdiction” that the grounds for a challenge to jurisdiction may include the reason 
that the claim is time-barred.95 Furthermore, it is considered that situations where the claimant 
has failed to follow the contractual requirement that all claims for varied or additional work to 
be first decided by an engineer before being referred to arbitration fall outside the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.96 However, as will be explained below, both of these defects, i.e. untimeliness and 
incompliance with a condition precedent to arbitration, ought to be correctly regarded as 
rendering the claims inadmissible.97 Also Christopher Brunner uses the concepts of jurisdiction 
and admissibility interchangeably by submitting, suitably in the context of contract adaptation, 
that “it may still be arguable whether an arbitral tribunal has the procedural power, i.e., the 
jurisdiction, to adapt a contract when the substantive law requirements of the hardship test are 
met. The discussion of the procedural admissibility of contract adaptation by an arbitral tribunal 
stems from the debate as to whether a ‘dispute’ exists […]”.98 
Gary Born in his study International Commercial Arbitration discusses admissibility regarding 
noncompliance with procedural requirements of arbitration agreement (but unfortunately not in 
any other possible relations). He does not characterize the issue as pertaining exclusively to 
admissibility but says that it can be viewed as either jurisdictional, admissibility or procedural 
and that the characterization depends on the parties’ intentions.99 Nevertheless, he does 
                                               
94 See Newcombe 2010. 
95 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 338. 
96 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 336. 
97 See later Chapter 3.4.1. 
98 Brunner 2009, 493. 
99 See Born 2014, 935 et seqq. 
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satisfactorily submit that it is appropriate to presume, absent contrary evidence, that pre-
arbitration procedural requirements are not “jurisdictional”.100 
3.3 Issues of Jurisdiction 
3.3.1 Dealing with the Relationship between Arbitration and Courts 
The jurisdictional issues in arbitration relate to the relationship between arbitration and courts. 
When jurisdiction is concerned, the question is who should decide the particular dispute i.e. 
whether the correct forum is arbitration or a court.101 Arbitration is always an exemption from 
the mandate of the courts, and thus the arbitrators cannot validly solve the dispute unless the 
parties have consented to arbitration thereby waiving their right to a court hearing. Indeed, the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal is fundamental to the tribunal’s authority and decision-
making power, and awards rendered without jurisdiction have no legitimacy.102 Therefore, due 
to the voluntary nature of arbitration, the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction always depends 
essentially on the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.103 The arbitration agreement can, however, 
confer only powers that are permissible under the applicable laws, and thus the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction is dependent also on the laws that make arbitration effective in the first place.104 
How states by their national legislation limit the parties’ freedom to diverge from the authority 
of the courts and agree on arbitration has varied over time due to introduction of different laws, 
sometimes favorable, sometimes hostile to arbitration.105 These developments, discovered in 
different jurisdictions, have always dealt with the relationship between arbitration and courts. 
They have redefined over time to what extent the parties are allowed to confer the authority to 
solve their disputes to arbitrators instead of a court and how arbitration agreements and decisions 
                                               
100 Born 2014, 937. 
101 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 338; Walters 2012, 661; Park 2007, 153; Santacrone 2017, 554. 
102 Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 329. On the other hand, the arbitration agreement also creates a duty for the tribunal 
to solve the disputes that fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Thus, jurisdiction can also be considered 
as a non-discretionary legal obligation to adjudicate. See Shany 2013, 787; Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 279. 
103 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 335; Walters 2012, 660; Santacrone 2017, 543; Jarvin 1987, 50. 
104 Redfern – Hunter 2004, 328. Therefore, the relationship between arbitration and litigation may differ country 
by country depending on how states by their national legislation limit the parties’ freedom to diverge from the 
authority of the courts and agree on arbitration. In the end, arbitration is based on law and is subject to its conditions 
and limitations. At this point, we are dealing with arbitrability. Different countries may have differing public policy 
concerns that preclude certain disputes from being submitted to arbitration. For example, some states allow only 
matters that are defined commercial by its own legislation to be referred to arbitration whereas in other countries 
also non-commercial disputes are considered arbitrable. Redfern – Hunter 2004, 328. 
105 About the historical developments of arbitration see David 1985, 84–88.  
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made by tribunals are generally recognized.106 Today modern international commercial 
arbitration has achieved a significant degree of independence from national courts and most 
commercial disputes are now arbitrable under the laws of most countries.107 For example, parties 
are no longer required to wait until the dispute has already arisen to submit that dispute to 
arbitration, but instead in a majority of cases the duty to arbitrate is established in regard of 
disputes that may possibly arise in the future.108 Moreover, the courts are not entitled to revise 
arbitrators’ decisions even in a case of wrong application of law, but are left with the limited 
role of policing procedural due process.109 Also, the recognition of the doctrines of separability 
and competence–competence indicate the deference of party autonomy in arbitration.110 In 
addition, as discussed above, the broad understanding of arbitrators’ powers and the recognition 
                                               
106 For example, in 1609 the Vinyor’s case established a common law doctrine regarding the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral agreements, which was the starting point for the evolution of the arbitration law in the 
common law systems. In the case the Court established two rules. The first rule was that arbitrators are only 
representatives of the parties and can be revoked at any time. Therefore, the parties’ agreement to arbitrate was not 
legally binding. According to the second rule, however, if a party had undertaken to a bond to pay a penalty if he 
did not comply with his promise to arbitrate, such undertaking was valid and enforceable in the courts. Also, if an 
award had been made, the parties were legally bound to honor it.  
 Later on, when the Statute against Fines was passed in England in 1687, arbitration was deprived of this vital 
element of the second rule that ensured that the commitment to arbitrate was respected. The statute allowed a party 
to revoke the arbitrator without having to pay the penalty which had been stipulated thus impeding the performance 
of the arbitration agreement. David 1985, 108–109. In the US, the Vynior’s Case was the controlling decision until 
a federal arbitration statute was passed in 1925. Certilman 2010, 10. More closely about the historical developments 
of arbitration and its evolution also in other countries see El-Ahdab 1990; David 1985, 84 et seqq.; Fouchard – 
Gaillard – Goldman 1999, 131 et seqq. 
107 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 124, 586 (“The trend has been towards increasing the scope of arbitrable disputes.”); 
Redfern – Hunter 2004, 329; Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 355–356; Moses 2008, 196.  
 In the strengthening of arbitration and its position in international framework the elaboration of the New York 
Convention in 1958 had the major significance. The Convention unifies the rules regarding international arbitration 
procedure by binding today a total of 162 states to undertake, give effect and enforce arbitration agreements and 
arbitral awards in their territories. About the elaboration, purpose and criticisms made of the New York Convention 
see David 1985, 145–148. 
 Later on, in 1985, an important instrument in harmonizing and modernizing the national arbitration laws, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, was introduced. The Model Law has now been adopted by 80 states as their national 
arbitration law (for the up to date list of the Model Law states and jurisdictions see 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_arbitration/status). It embodied the primacy of 
the principle of party autonomy and the minimalist approach to the scope of courts’ supervision and intervention 
in the arbitration process thereby further strengthening the position of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution 
method. Following the introduction of the Model Law, these approaches have now been recognized in all modern 
arbitration laws. Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 28. 
108 David 1985, 30; Redfern – Hunter 2004, 7. 
109 Redfern – Hunter 2004, 329. 
110 However, despite of the relative independency of arbitration, the relationship between arbitration and courts 
continues to be in a change. Indeed, there have been signs of increasing opposition to unbounded party autonomy 
in favor of the strengthening role for the courts. For example, the question of interim measures has focused the 
discussion to the respective roles of arbitrators and the courts. Redfern – Hunter 2004, 329.  
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of contract adaptation within the authority of arbitral tribunals are illustrations of arbitration’s 
remarkably increased independency. 
The jurisdictional issues can be separated to three common categories which concern (i) whether 
the parties have validly agreed on arbitration, (ii) whether the particular dispute falls within the 
scope of the arbitration agreement and (iii) whether the agreement to arbitrate is in violation of 
public policy.111 Following the relatively broad freedom to agree on arbitration (meaning the 
limited scope of non-arbitrable disputes), the most central limitations to the arbitral tribunal’s 
jurisdiction often relate to the contours of the parties’ arbitration agreement.112 A challenge to 
the tribunal’s jurisdiction forms a battle between arbitration and court proceedings. If the 
tribunal does not have jurisdiction the necessary corollary is that the competent body to settle 
the dispute is some alternative forum i.e. a court.113 The other way around, if the arbitrators have 
the jurisdiction, the court must refrain from hearing the case.114 In this light the arbitration 
agreement could perhaps be illustratively described as a strainer: matters that do not stay in its 
net will fall through and suffice for litigation. Thus, what is characteristic for jurisdictional 
issues is that if the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is challenged the intended effect is to send the 
dispute to a court.115 In that regard, challenges to jurisdiction can be called “forum 
dependent”.116  
3.3.2 Possibility to a Court Review 
A fundamental character in arbitration is that arbitral tribunals possess the capacity to rule on 
their own jurisdiction. This principle of competence–competence is generally accepted 
throughout different jurisdictions.117 However, such rule can exist only because the courts are 
                                               
111 Park 2007, 148–149; Nota 2010, 33; Walters 2012, 661.  
112 See Moses 2008, 196. 
113 For example, if an award is vacated because the tribunal lacked jurisdiction, then, assuming there is no time bar, 
the prevailing party should be able to initiate a court action. Moses 2008, 199. 
114 Born 2014, 1276–1277. This requirement is of fundamental nature to arbitration and is recognized in the rules 
of international arbitration statutes and conventions. See Art. 8 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and Art. II(3) of the 
New York Convention. 
115 Rau 2014, 17; Paulsson 2013, 90; Park 2007, 153; Nota 2010, 33. 
116 Rau 2014, 17. 
117 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 339; Born 2014, 1051; Synková 2013, 60. Most national arbitration laws, including e.g. 
the English Arbitration Act 1996 (see Section 30) and the laws of the 80 countries that have adopted the Model 
Law (see Art. 16), comprise an express provision regarding the competence–competence principle. Also, the 
majority of institutional arbitration rules, such as the ICC Rules, the LCIA Rules and UNCITRAL Rules, spell out 
the principle. And even if such express provisions did not exist in the applicable regulation arbitral tribunals have 
traditionally assumed the right to rule on their own jurisdiction. Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 333. However, despite 
of the almost universal recognition of the competence–competence principle, especially the scope of the arbitrators’ 
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able to subsequently review the tribunals’ jurisdictional rulings.118 Indeed, the reviewability of 
jurisdictional decisions is another fundamentality in arbitration and further reflects the 
continuous relationship between arbitration and courts. Any award given by an arbitral tribunal 
regarding its jurisdiction may be set aside or refused recognition and enforcement by a 
competent court.119 Such complete review is necessary in order to avoid binding a party to a 
decision made in an arbitral proceeding to which it never agreed thus denying its access to 
national courts, which is a fundamental right in most legal systems.120 Thus, whereas arbitrators’ 
decisions on the merits of the parties’ disputes are final and non-reviewable,121 on jurisdictional 
matters the courts always have the final word. This principle has been adopted in the Model 
Law as well as in the New York Convention122, which makes it applicable almost globally.123 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that some jurisdictions regard only positive but not negative 
decisions on jurisdiction to be reviewable. For example, Art. 16(3) of the Model Law provides 
for review only in cases where the tribunal has ruled that is has jurisdiction meanwhile Art. 5 
restricts court intervention only to matters provided in the Model Law. Thus, it has been 
considered that negative decisions on jurisdiction are not reviewable under the Model Law.124 
The reason for not providing recourse to the courts in case of a negative jurisdictional decision 
is that it would be inappropriate to compel arbitrators who have made such a ruling to continue 
with the proceedings.125 The same approach has been expressly adopted for example in the 
                                               
powers to rule on their own jurisdiction is subject to considerable differences among legal orders. Synková 2013, 
61; see Born 2014, 1052. 
118 Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, 885. 
119 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 344; Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 337; Kajkowska 2017, 164. See Art. V(1)(a) and (c) 
of the New York Convention and Art. 34(2)(a)(i) and (iii) of the Model Law. 
120 Born 2014, 1226; Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 337. See e.g. First Options. v. Kaplan (1995), 942, where it was 
stated that a party who has not agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a court’s decision about the merits 
of its dispute. 
121 With the exception of plausible public policy grounds that may permit challenging the award also on the merits. 
Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 337. 
122 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958). 
123 See Arts. 16(3), 34 and 36 of the Model Law (with regard to setting aside and refusal of recognition or 
enforcement) and Art. V of the New York Convention (with regard to the refusal of recognition and enforcement 
of awards). 
124 Kröll 2014, 61. PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v. Dexia Bank SA, para. 68. The decision was rendered 
under Singaporean arbitration law, which is an adoption of the Model Law. 
125 UNCITRAL Report A740/17, para.163. PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v. Dexia Bank SA, para. 68. The 
court also held that the definition of an “award” does not include a negative determination on jurisdiction as it is 
not a decision on the substance of the dispute. On the contrary, it is a decision not to determine the substance of the 
dispute, and therefore cannot be an award for the purposes of Art 34 of the Model Law (para. 66). Consequently, 
the tribunal’s negative decision on jurisdiction could not be reviewed either at a post-award stage. 
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arbitration laws of the Netherlands and Hong Kong.126 However, some jurisdictions have taken 
the opposite position. For example, the Swiss and Swedish arbitration acts expressly provide for 
recourse against a tribunal’s decision denying jurisdiction.127 Also England and France seem to 
have adopted the same approach.128 Thus, it can be remarked that the courts do not always hold 
the ultimate power to control the tribunals’ decisions on jurisdiction. However, in cases where 
the tribunal makes a negative jurisdictional ruling the claim can still be brought to a court and 
be decided on the merits of the case. 
Recourse to the courts regarding (positive) decisions on jurisdiction is possible at three different 
stages of the proceedings. First, the challenging party can defer the matter to the courts at the 
beginning of the arbitral process. It can seek an anti-arbitration injunction to restrain the tribunal 
from proceeding or a declaration to the effect that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction to deal with the 
claim in question.129 The party can also initiate court proceedings in respect of the matters in 
dispute when the other party is likely to seek the court to stay the litigation and to enforce the 
arbitration agreement by referring the parties to arbitration on the basis of Art. II(3) of the New 
York Convention.130 The latter option is however effective only if the courts of the jurisdiction 
where the arbitration is seated have the power to intervene concurrently in an international 
arbitration during the course of the proceedings,131 and to make already at that stage a full and 
final determination of the tribunal’s jurisdiction instead of referring the matter to be resolved by 
the arbitrators.132 
                                               
126 The Dutch Arbitration Act provides in Art. 1052(5) that ”[u]nless the parties have agreed otherwise, the court 
shall have jurisdiction to try the case if the arbitral tribunal declares that it lacks jurisdiction”. Thus, the provision 
implies that the tribunal’s decision is final and binding on the courts. Kröll 2014, 58. Art. 35(4) of the Hong Kong 
Arbitration Ordinance states that ”[a] ruling of the arbitral tribunal that it does not have jurisdiction to decide a 
dispute is not subject to appeal”. In addition, the same position, although not expressly provided for in the law, 
seems to have been accepted at least in Austria and Spain. Kröll 2014, 60. 
127 Art. 190(2)(b) of the Swiss Private International Law Act provides that “[p]roceedings for setting aside the 
award may only be initiated: […] (b) where the arbitral tribunal has wrongly declared itself to have or not to have 
jurisdiction”. Section 27 of the Swedish Arbitration Act states that “[t]he issues referred to the arbitrators shall be 
decided in an award. If the arbitrators terminate the arbitral proceedings without deciding such issues, this shall 
also be done through an award”. Furthermore, section 36 of the Act allows for recourse against such a decision. 
128 Kröll 2014, 59–60. See Art. 67(1) of the English Arbitration Act 1996. About France, see the rulings of the Paris 
Court of Appeals Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Tunisiens.JM. Voith AG (1995) and Societe Swiss Oil v. 
Societe Petrogab and Republic of Gabon (1988). 
129 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 346; Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 339. 
130 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 346; Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 330. 
131 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 346. 
132 It differs between countries which standard (prima facie or full review approach) the court employs when it 
determines the existence, validity and scope of the arbitration agreement in order to decide whether to stay the 
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Second, the party can resort to the courts during the arbitral process. If the arbitral tribunal’s 
jurisdiction is contested the tribunal often makes an interim award regarding the jurisdictional 
issues before addressing the merits of the case.133 Then the party may often challenge the award 
immediately in the local courts.134 For example, the Model Law provides that if the arbitral 
tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, a party may request, within thirty 
days, the court to decide the matter.135 Thus, a recourse to the court is permitted before an award 
on the merits of the case has been rendered, which enables reaching a final decision on the 
matter already at the early stage of the proceedings.136 
Third, the reluctant party may seek the tribunal’s decision on its jurisdiction to be reviewed by 
a court after the arbitration proceedings have finished and the final award has been issued. The 
party may challenge the award in the courts of the country where the arbitration was seated or, 
if the other party is seeking enforcement of the award, refuse the enforcement on the basis of 
lack of jurisdiction.137 Moreover, although the grounds for setting aside and refusing recognition 
and enforcement of the award are virtually the same, the party could resist the award at both 
stages leading to duplicate court review.138 Notably, the results reached in the two parallel 
proceedings are not necessarily the same.139 
                                               
litigation process and refer the parties to arbitration. In jurisdictions that apply the prima facie approach (such as 
Singapore, Hongkong and Australia), the court conducts a preliminary evaluation of the existence and scope of the 
arbitration agreement and, if it is prima facie satisfied that there is a valid arbitration agreement that covers the 
dispute in question, allows the issue to be resolved by the arbitral tribunal with respect to the competence–
competence principle. Instead, in countries that have adopted the full review approach (such as England and the 
Nordic countries), the court examines and determines those matters itself and renders a final decision on the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction. Thus, it depends on the approach exercised by the courts of the seat whether the party 
resisting the tribunal’s jurisdiction benefits from commencing court proceedings i.e. whether the issue of the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction will actually be properly decided by the court. More about this topic see e.g. Gaillard 2005; 
Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 345–350. 
133 Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 336; Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 363. 
134 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 343. 
135 See Art. 16(3) of the Model Law. The article also states that while such request is pending, the arbitral tribunal 
may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award on the merits.  
136 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 343. It should be noted that this option does not apply in investment arbitration where 
a court may review the issue of the tribunal’s jurisdiction only in respect of final awards where all the questions 
submitted to the tribunal have been dealt with.  
137 These possibilities are provided for, for example, in Arts. 34 and 36 of the Model Law and Art. V of the New 
York Convention. However, in order to use this route, the party should expressly raise an objection to the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction already at the early stage of the proceedings so that its inactivity in the matter during the proceedings 
cannot be considered as a waiver of the objection. Redfern – Hunter 2015, 346–347; Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 
330–331; Born 2014, 1249. For example, Art. 16(2) of the Model law expressly provides that any objection to the 
jurisdiction of an arbitration tribunal has to be raised no later than the statement of defence. 
138 Šarčević 1989, 194. 
139 Šarčević 1989, 194. 
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As we see, the decisions concerning jurisdictional issues can be subjected to court review at 
several instances during the arbitral proceedings. The possibility to recourse to a court secures 
the parties’ right to litigate (access to court) and prevents them from being forced to arbitration 
without their consent. However, it simultaneously enables the reluctant respondent to cause 
considerable delay in the dispute resolution process for simply tactical reasons.140 Therefore, it 
proves to be of significant relevance whether a particular question is treated as jurisdictional or 
as something else (such as of admissibility) when the possibility to a review would not exist. 
3.4 Issues of Admissibility 
3.4.1 Questioning the Acceptability of the Claim  
Whereas jurisdictional issues relate to determining the competent body to decide the claim, 
questions of admissibility concern whether the claim itself is capable of being adjudicated; in 
other words, whether the claim is defective in some way.141 Thus, if a certain tribunal is found 
to have jurisdiction the question is what claims that tribunal is entitled to decide within its 
jurisdiction. Paulsson submits that in order to define whether a particular issue pertains to 
jurisdiction or admissibility, it should be asked whether the objecting party is taking aim at the 
tribunal or at the claim.142 If the party’s objection challenges the tribunal as the appropriate 
forum to resolve the dispute, the objection is jurisdictional. Instead, if the party objects the claim 
itself and claims that it should not be hear at all (at any forum), the issue is one of 
                                               
140 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 343; Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 331; see Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 363–364. 
141 Paulsson 2005, 616; Walters 2012, 661; Santacroce 2017, 540, 546. Keith Highet accurately defined in his 
dissenting opinion in Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (para. 58) that “[j]urisdiction is the power 
of the tribunal to hear the case; admissibility is whether the case itself is defective—whether it is appropriate for 
the tribunal to hear it”. Similarly, the tribunal in Abaclat v. Argentina (2011) defined that “[w]hile a lack of 
jurisdiction stricto sensu means that the claim cannot at all be brought in front of the body called upon, a lack of 
admissibility means that the claim was neither fit nor mature for judicial treatment” (para. 247). Another 
formulation for the same distinction is to say that jurisdiction raises a question of the existence of the tribunal’s 
adjudicative power whereas admissibility concerns the exercise of such power, which may require dismissal of the 
claim on the grounds of a certain legal defect. See Douglas 2009, 141, 148.  
 Cf. Shany who a little questionably submits that the difference between jurisdiction and admissibility is that 
whereas jurisdiction forms a non-discretionary legal obligation for the tribunal to adjudicate, admissibility is a right 
but not a duty to adjudicate. See Shany 2013, 787. 
142 Paulsson 2005, 616. Similarly, already in 1986 Fitzmaurice defined that an objection to the substantive 
admissibility of a claim is a plea that the tribunal should rule the claim to be inadmissible on some ground other 
than its ultimate merits, while an objection to the jurisdiction of the tribunal is a plea that the tribunal itself is 
incompetent to give any ruling at all whether as to the merits or as to the admissibility of the claim. Fitzmaurice 
1986, 438–439. 
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admissibility.143 This test seems to be widely accepted by other commentators and utilized also 
in case law.144  
According to Lim, Ho and Paparinskis, the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility 
can alternatively be defined also in a more “draftsmanlike” manner focusing on “the place that 
the issue occupies in the structure of international dispute settlement”.145 This means that the 
relevant question would be whether the challenge is related to the interpretation and application 
of the jurisdictional clause of the international tribunal (and hence jurisdictional) or to the 
interpretation and application of another rule or instrument (and is hence one of 
admissibility).146 This view can be helpful when classifying a certain issue to be jurisdictional 
or to concern admissibility. Indeed, when establishing the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the 
jurisdictional clause i.e. the arbitration agreement is the key element that surely needs to be 
applied and interpreted. Thus, if the arbitration agreement does not need to be observed, with 
high likelihood the nature of the issue is not jurisdictional. However, it is not necessarily so that 
the jurisdictional clause does not provide relevant material for interpretation in cases of 
admissibility. Instead, admissibility issues can be described as having a mixed or hybrid 
character which combines both procedural and substantive rules.147 Thus, defining a claim’s 
admissibility may require interpretation of the jurisdictional clause as well.  
When making the division between jurisdiction and admissibility attention should be drawn to 
the feature that if the arbitral tribunal lacks jurisdiction, the jurisdiction would by default be on 
the courts. Thus, Paulsson’s test seems meaningful as it focuses on determining whether it is the 
tribunal or the claim itself that is objected. In cases of admissibility, there will be no 
                                               
143 Paulsson 2005, 617. 
144 See e.g. Nota 2010, 33; Walters 2012, 661; Douglas 2009, 148; Synková 2013, 41; Hugues Arthur 2014, 458; 
Gouiffès – Ordonez 2015, 110; Santacroce 2017, 554; BAZ v. BBA (2018), paras. 129, 131; İçkale v. Turkmenistan 
(2016), paras. 245–246; Hochtief v. Argentina (2011), para. 90. 
 For example, in İçkale v. Turkmenistan the majority of the ICSID tribunal followed the classification introduced 
by Paulsson and considered that the failure to exhaust local remedies may render the claim inadmissible as the 
claim could, and the tribunal cited Paulsson, “not be heard at all (or at least yet)”, i.e., until the claimant has taken 
the necessary procedural steps and complied with the domestic litigation requirement (para. 246). Cf. Partially 
Dissenting Opinion of Professor Philippe Sands who understood Paulsson’s argument regarding the nature of a 
claim in case of failure to exhaust local remedies differently and held that the issue concerns jurisdiction (para. 10). 
However, it does not seem that Professor Sands would contest the test introduced by Paulsson or object to its 
application in the way utilized by the majority of the tribunal in other admissibility situations but only in cases of 
failure to exhaust local remedies.  
145 Lim – Ho – Paparinskis 2018, 118. 
146 Lim – Ho – Paparinskis 2018, 118. 
147 ICC case 6474 (1992), para. 62, in van den Berg 2000, 291. 
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jurisdictional objection, but the issue falls entirely within the arbitrators’ competence and the 
tribunal is required to decide the question in the course of fulfilling its underlying mandate.148 
Indeed, the party raising an admissibility challenge does not contest the particular tribunal as 
the correct forum to try the claim,149 but in fact wants the arbitrators to have the jurisdiction so 
that they are competent to find that the claim is inadmissible and should not be heard.  
Therefore, as jurisdiction is a necessary prerequisite for the tribunal’s ability to rule a claim 
inadmissible, a party may not reasonably claim simultaneously that the tribunal lacks 
jurisdiction and that the claim should be found inadmissible (see Figure 1 earlier in Chapter 
2.3).150 Nevertheless, it is of course still be possible to argue as a primary claim that the tribunal 
lacks jurisdiction and as a secondary and alternative claim that even if the tribunal would have 
the jurisdiction in any event the claim is inadmissible.151 Respectively, Fitzmaurice determined 
the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility as follows: “But an unsuccessful 
jurisdictional plea leaves open the possibility that a finding on the ultimate merits may still be 
excluded through a decision given against the substantive admissibility of the claim”.152  
Due to the inevitability of the existence of the tribunal’s jurisdiction in order to make further 
decisions on the case, admissibility challenges may be dealt with only after the tribunal has 
found to have jurisdiction.153 For example in ICC case 6474 the tribunal held that ”[i]t is correct 
to state that a decision as to the admissibility of the claim […] presupposes that the Tribunal has 
first found it had jurisdiction”.154 Admissibility challenges need, however, to be addressed 
before the merits, because finding a claim inadmissible prevents the tribunal from making a 
decision on the material side of the dispute.155 Indeed, if parties have set a certain limitation in 
their agreement and the purpose of such limitation was particularly to be a limitation on the 
claim and not on the tribunal, the tribunal should enforce that agreement by not accepting 
                                               
148 Born 2014, 1225–1226.  
149 Paulsson 2005, 616; Walters 2012, 661. 
150 Similarly, see Fontanelli 2018, 106. 
151 For example, in SCC case V079/2005 the respondent raised both jurisdiction and admissibility defenses and 
requested the tribunal to issue an award “(a) Determining that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claim brought by 
Claimant; (b) In the alternative, determining that the claim brought by Claimant is inadmissible” (para. 28). 
152 Fitzmaurice 1986, 439. 
153 Paulsson 2005, 604; Synková 2012, 38; Nota 2010, 32; Walters 2012, 661; Santacroce 2017, 543, 547. 
154 ICC case 6474 (1992), para. 46, in van den Berg 2000, 288. 
155 In the case of an inadmissible claim/counterclaim, the tribunal will dismiss it due to inadmissibility without 
entering into the merits (Steinbruger at p 680). Lim – Ho – Paparinskis 2018, 121; Waibel 2014, 7; Walters 2012, 
661; Amerasinghe 2011, 95; Fitzmaurice 1986, 438. 
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inadequate or defective claims.156 As a result, the tribunal should dismiss the claim and issue an 
award where it concludes that the claim is inadmissible due to its defectiveness and cannot be 
further examined. This upholds the parties’ intention to not to arbitrate matters that were not 
meant to suffice for judicial dispute resolution. 
A claim’s inadmissibility may ensue from various different grounds. The most typical situations 
that seem to be generally recognized to pertain to admissibility include the claim’s timeliness157 
and fulfillment of arbitral preconditions158. These grounds for inadmissibility may arise in 
situations where for example the parties’ arbitration agreement defines that the claim needs to 
be raised within a particular time period or conversely that it may not be raised until a particular 
procedural precondition (such as a negotiation or mediation obligation) has been complied with. 
In the former event, the claim is stale and thereby irrevocably inadmissible. In the second 
scenario, the claim is premature and thus not yet ripe for arbitration. In either situation, it results 
from the inadmissibility that the arbitral tribunal should dismiss the claim and the claimant may 
not subsequently try the claim in a court. This is sensible as the purpose of setting such 
conditions to the arbitral proceedings was most likely not to prefer court as the proper forum 
when the limitations are not followed but to ensure for example that disputes would not linger 
or that the parties will be willing to try to solve the dispute amicably.159 
Inadmissibility may result also from for example waiver of claims (if a claim is abandoned it 
could hardly suffice for any adjudication), failure of new claims to remain within the scope of 
the initial notice, mootness or absence of a legal dispute or a necessary third party.160 In the 
context of investment arbitration, a claim may be inadmissible due to a failure to exhaust local 
remedies.161 Other plausible grounds for inadmissibility that have been introduced include res 
                                               
156 See Paulsson 2005, 616. 
157 Paulsson 2005, 616; Synková 2012, 38; Park 2007, 153; Born 2014, 942; Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 508–
509; BAZ v. BBA, para. 131 (“The commentators consider an objection based on time limitation to be an issue 
of admissibility of claim […] I agree. An objection based on time limitation targets the claim, and not the 
tribunal.”); Tommy C.P. v. Li & Fung (2002); Ambatielos case (1953). 
158 Paulsson 2005, 616; Synková 2012, 38; Park 2007, 153; Jarrosson 2003, 367; see Born 2014, 937; see Rau 2014, 
11–12; Abaclat v. Argentina (2011); Nihon Plast v. Takata-Petri (2004); Société Polyclinique des Fleurs v. Peyrin 
(2000); Poiré v. Tripier (2003); Cable & Wireless v. IBM (2002). About the positions of different national laws see 
Kajkowska 2017, 168–171. 
159 See Paulsson 2005, 616; Rau 2014, 16–17. 
160 Paulsson 2005, 609, 616; Synková 2012, 38; see Crawford 2019, 667 et seqq; Born 2014, 942. 
161 Waibel 2014, 75; Amerasinghe 2011, 95; Crawford 2019, 667; Ambatielos case (1953); İçkale v. Turkmenistan 
(2016); SCC case V079/2005. 
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judicata (a claim must be rejected because it has already been decided in prior proceedings)162, 
a party’s incapability to conclude an arbitration agreement (i.e. to be a party to the 
proceedings)163 and situations regarding diplomatic protection164. Furthermore, in SGS Société 
Générale v. Philippines it was held that when a party attempts to rely on a contract as the basis 
of its claim without itself complying with such contract, there is an impediment to its reliance, 
and such impediment is to be considered rather as a matter of admissibility than jurisdiction.165 
Based on the same idea that an action may not be maintained by someone who has misbehaved 
in relation to the subject matter of the claim, inadmissibility may be caused by the claimant’s 
involvement in unlawful activity (the “clean hands” doctrine).166 It is well-grounded to treat 
these issues as of admissibility rather than jurisdictional as, again, it would not seem reasonable 
to leave room for the claim’s adjudication in a court but rather to dismiss the claim altogether 
from judicial resolution due to its defectiveness. 
3.4.2 Finality of the Decision and Parties’ Burden of Raising the Objection 
A dominant feature in arbitration is that only jurisdictional decisions are reviewable.167 Once it 
is established that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction over the dispute, all other issues arising 
out of the dispute, including issues concerning the admissibility of the claim, fall within the 
scope of an arbitral tribunal’s exclusive adjudicatory powers.168 This means that the arbitral 
tribunal’s decision on admissibility is not reviewable by courts (or in ICSID arbitrations by 
ICSID ad hoc committee).169 Thus, if the challenge is not jurisdictional but goes to admissibility, 
the arbitrators’ decision on the issue is final.170 Following this reasoning, for example the court 
in BAZ v. BBA considered that when determining what constitutes a ground for challenging an 
award under Art. 34 of the Model Law, a decision on an issue that is characterised as of 
admissibility does not fall under any ground of Art. 34.171 Respectively, neither does the New 
                                               
162 Walters 2012, 671 et seqq; Hahn 2014, 337; Mariott Hotels v. JNAH Deveopment SA (2010); Chiron Corp v. 
Ortho Diagnostics Systems (2000) (where, however, the US court again operated with the concept of arbitrability). 
163 Automobiles Peugeot v. Omega Plus (2001), in Born 2014, 726. 
164 Amerasinghe 2011, 97. 
165 SGS Société Générale v. Philippines, para. 158. 
166 Crawford 2019, 675. 
167 In other words, decisions of arbitrators having jurisdiction are final. Paulsson 2005, 601, 603. 
168 Santacroce 2017, 553. 
169 Paulsson 2005, 601; Walters 2012, 662; Nota 2010, 31; Swissbourgh v. Lesotho (2018), para. 208.  
170 Paulsson 2005, 601, 617; Synková 2013, 39; referring to Paulsson see BAZ v. BBA (2018), para. 130. 
171 BAZ v. BBA (2018), paras. 128, 130, 132.  
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York Convention allow state courts to review such decisions.172 Nevertheless, it must be 
clarified that state courts are not bound by an arbitral tribunal’s characterization of the relevant 
issues but may make their own analysis of the nature of the relevant preliminary issue in order 
to determine the scope and extent to which they may review, if at all, the arbitral award.173 
The same deference to determinations of admissibility should correspondingly be shown in 
situations where a court is making a prior determination of whether the case must be heard in 
arbitration. If the claim’s admissibility is challenged at pre-award stage, the court must refrain 
from expressing a view concerning the admissibility but refer the issue to the arbitrators.174 
Therefore, in regard of non-reviewability, decisions on admissibility are treated similarly to 
arbitrators’ decisions on merits.175 As the possibility to appeal does not exist, the parties carry 
the risk that the tribunal they have chosen has the competence to consider and apply all the 
relevant facts and the applicable law correctly when making a decision on admissibility.  
Moreover, classifying an issue as of admissibility may have an influence on whether the tribunal 
can or should consider admissibility upon its own initiative or only upon a party’s request. In 
                                               
172 Santacroce 2017, 567. Thus, a decision on an admissibility issue cannot fall under any ground under Art. V of 
the New York Convention. 
173 Santacroce 2017, 563.  
174 Paulsson 2005, 605; Synková 2013, 39. In Ambatielos case of 1953 (Greece vs. UK), decided by the ICJ, the 
Court was faced with a challenge to its jurisdiction to decide the dispute. The Court considered whether under a 
particular treaty the dispute should be referred to arbitration. The UK had claimed that the claim could not be heard 
because local remedies had not been exhausted and because the claim was presented after undue delay. The Court 
held that the objections raised by the UK were “arguments in defence directed to the admissibility of the Ambatielos 
claim […] the Court expresses no view concerning the validity or legal effect of these arguments”. Consequently, 
the objections were left to be decided by the arbitrators. 
 Similarly, in Great Western Mortgage Corporation v. Peacock (1997) the Third Circuit of the US Court of 
Appeals held that as the question of whether an employee has validly waived his right to punitive damages resulting 
from unlawful discrimination is not relevant to the nature of the forum but is separate from the issue of consent to 
an arbitral forum, it is for the arbitrator to decide (para. 232). Although the Court did not expressly classify the 
issue as of admissibility, it accepted and enforced the division of tasks between the tribunal and itself according to 
which all matters other than those concerning the existence of the arbitrators’ jurisdiction need to be finally 
determined by the tribunal. 
 Already in 1964 the US Supreme Court considered in Wiley v. Livingston, which involved a question of whether 
a mandatory two-step negotiating process had been accomplished as a precondition to arbitration, that “[o]nce it is 
determined, as we have, that the parties are obligated to submit the subject matter of a dispute to arbitration, 
“procedural” questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition should be left to the 
arbitrator”.  
 In a more recent case Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds (2002), 84, the US Supreme Court built its decision on 
the former precedent and held that the presumption is that allegations of waiver, delay or like defenses should be 
decided by the arbitrator. Although reaching the right conclusion in that matter, the Court incorrectly called the 
issue one of arbitrability instead of admissibility. About the analysis and critique of the American use of the word 
“arbitrability” see Paulsson 2005, 609 et seqq. as well as Chapter 3.2.2. of this study. 
175 Nota 2010, 31. 
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other words, it affects whether the parties have a burden of raising the admissibility objection.176 
Regarding jurisdictional issues the tribunal has an obligation to examine the possible lack of its 
jurisdiction at its own initiative although not raised by the parties.177 By contrast, it seems that 
such obligation does not exist regarding issues of admissibility but the objection is for the parties 
to invoke.178 It is not clear, however, whether the tribunal would be prevented from considering 
admissibility where the parties have not themselves raised the defence. In Abaclat v. Argentina, 
after the tribunal had found that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, it stated that even though 
“some of the issues addressed in this section may have been invoked by the Parties within the 
context of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction […] the Tribunal considers that these issues are not matters 
of jurisdiction but of admissibility. Where this applies, any argument raised by the Parties with 
regard to these issues and aiming to establish a lack of jurisdiction is addressed below as an 
argument of lack of admissibility”.179 Thus, the tribunal considered it justified to correct the 
nature of the parties’ objections by its own motion. 
Tribunals’ powers to raise admissibility issues on their own initiative can be considered 
problematic in the sense that generally even on the merits of the case tribunals are not entitled 
to grant remedies or impose duties that the parties themselves have not requested.180 Following 
this rule, if the respondent has not chosen to object the claim’s admissibility but for example 
only the tribunal’s jurisdiction, it would not be for the tribunal to develop that defense for it. 
                                               
176 Walters 2012, 662. 
177 Lim – Ho – Paparinskis 2018, 142; Nota 2010, 32.  
178 Lim – Ho – Paparinskis 2018, 142; Nota 2010, 32; Fontanelli 2018, 107; Santacroce 2017, 551. Cf. Larsen v. 
Hawaii (2001) where it was considered that the tribunal was obliged to consider objections on admissibility by 
their own initiative (proprio motu). The case raised questions as to the existence of a real dispute between the 
parties and the absence of the United States as necessary third party. Waibel 2010, 68, fn. 288. However, the 
decision has been considered to be “seemingly unusual”. See Fontanelli 2018, 107, fn. 553. 
179 Abaclat v. Argentina (2011), paras. 504–505. Also, in Renée Rose Levy v. Peru (2015) the tribunal noted (paras. 
180–181) that the parties had not expressly discussed the nature of the abuse of process objection and whether it 
was a matter of jurisdiction, admissibility or something else. The respondent had grouped all its objections under 
the heading “Jurisdictonal Objections” or “Jurisdiction/Abuse of Process”, and thereby did not expressly raise 
admissibility defense. Although the tribunal thereby raised the issue by its own initiative, it concluded that the 
characterization of the objection can be left open in the present case as it would not have any impact on the outcome 
of the case. The tribunal did not further reason why the characterization would not have any impact. However, the 
tribunal still seemed to consider that it would have been entitled to classify and treat the objection as an 
admissibility issue if it had considered it meaningful. 
180 This serves as a ground for refusing the enforcement and recognition of the award under Art. V(1)(c) of the New 
York Convention. For example, Born submits that “Article V(1)(c) can apply where a valid arbitration agreement 
existed, but the issues and claims decided by an award exceeded or differed from those presented to the tribunal by 
the parties in the arbitration (so-called extra petita or ultra petita); the same characterization applies where a 
tribunal grants relief that neither party has requested”. Born 2014, 3545. 
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Therefore, the tribunal would lack jurisdiction to dismiss the claim due to its inadmissibility.181 
After all, finding a claim inadmissible is even more drastic consequence for the claimant (at 
least in cases of permanent inadmissibility) than rejecting the claim on the basis of lack of 
jurisdiction. If the tribunal is found to lack jurisdiction the claimant could at least have the claim 
tried in a court. Instead, in case of inadmissibility the dispute could not be decided by anyone. 
This consequence is not necessarily desired by the respondent either and thus it is a little 
controversial that the tribunal could define a claim inadmissible without the parties’ request. On 
the other hand, in such situation the respondent could still declare that it waives its possibility 
to object the admissibility. 
Also, it can be asked if tribunals should be bound by the parties’ arguments even at the risk of 
reaching a decision that it does not consider to be legally correct, i.e. to treat jurisdictional issues 
as of admissibility following the parties’ submissions.182 This cannot by any means be 
considered to be the case but the distinction between the two concepts should be kept clear and 
consistent. However, the tribunal still should not have the right to raise admissibility objections 
on behalf of the parties.183 Hence, I agree with the tribunal in Hochtief v. Argentina that stated 
that “[t]he disputing parties are entitled to raise objections based upon questions of admissibility, 
but they are not bound to do so; and if they do not raise those objections, they will have 
acquiesced in any breach of the requirements of admissibility and that acquiescence will ‘cure’ 
the breach. The tribunal, if it has jurisdiction, will proceed to hear the case”.184 Thus, if the 
parties have incorrectly objected the jurisdiction on the grounds that correctly pertain to 
admissibility, the tribunal should declare that on the basis of the party’s arguments labelled as 
jurisdictional challenge the tribunal cannot find that it lacks jurisdiction. And as the party has 
                                               
181 For example, in SA Prim'Nature v. SAS Top Pommes de Terre (2008) the arbitral tribunal had declared a 
rejoinder filed in breach of the time limits inadmissible. The Paris Court of Appeal annulled the award on the basis 
that no request for inadmissibility had been made by the opposing party, and that the tribunal had taken its decision 
without giving the parties the opportunity to comment on it. 
182 In İçkale v. Turkmenistan (2016) the tribunal submitted that the parties had incorrectly taken the position that 
the objection that the claimant has failed to comply with the domestic litigation requirement is an objection to 
jurisdiction rather than to admissibility. The tribunal considered that it has the authority to decide independently, 
within its Kompetenz-Kompetenz, and without being bound by the parties’ legal positions, as to whether the 
objection raised by the respondent constitutes an objection to jurisdiction or an objection to admissibility. It held 
that if this were not the case, and if the tribunal were to be considered bound by the legal argument of the parties, 
the tribunal might have to reach a decision that it does not consider to be legally correct. Consequently, the tribunal 
proceeded to address the objection as a matter of admissibility. See paras. 234 et seqq. 
183 Cf. Shany 2013, 788.  
184 Hochtief v. Argentina (2011), para. 94. 
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not raised objections to the admissibility, it is to be considered as waving its possibility to such 
objection. 
3.4.3 A Procedural or Substantive Matter? 
Another question worth to ponder (for which the basis for discussion was laid earlier in Chapter 
2.3) is whether admissibility challenges pertain to procedural or substantive issues in arbitration. 
On the basis of the examined literature and case law (few of them taking a stand directly at the 
issue), the characterization is not at all clear. The relevance of the question is that classifying 
admissibility issues as procedural or substantive defines which laws should be applied to resolve 
the question.185 In ICC case 6476 the tribunal expressly recognized that “[w]hether the claims 
are inadmissible […] raises, in an international situation like the present one, a preliminary 
question of some complexity, that of which law governs the question? The answer would seem 
to depend on the characterization of the question, i.e. on its nature as a procedural question or 
as a substantive question”.186 If the admissibility issue was characterized as procedural, it would 
be governed by the same laws as the questions of jurisdiction, i.e. the law applicable to the 
interpretation of the arbitration agreement and the arbitration law of the seat (lex arbitri) as well 
as the possible institutional arbitration rules.187 Conversely, if the issue belonged to the 
substantive matters, it would be governed by the law of the underlying contract i.e. lex causae 
(which may be different from the law applicable to the arbitration agreement).188 
It seems that several authors discussing admissibility presuppose that admissibility would be a 
substantive issue. For example, Paulsson stipulates that “Fitzmaurice did not go on to state 
explicitly that such issues of admissibility, like other substantive matters, are not subject to 
review once decided by a tribunal having jurisdiction”.189 Also, Walters states that labelling an 
objection as jurisdictional or admissibility determines whether the objection is of a procedural 
or substantive nature and that ”admissibility objections strike at the merits of the dispute”.190 
Furthermore, Born submits that “an arbitral tribunal’s resolution of disputes over time limits, 
statutes of limitations and similar pre-arbitration requirements will not be subject to material 
                                               
185 Waincymer 2012, 8–9; Walters 2012, 662, 664 (submitting that “understanding the distinction [between 
jurisdictional and admissibility challenges] allows the arbitrators to apply the proper law”). 
186 ICC case 6474 (1992), para. 57, in van den Berg 2000, 290. 
187 See ICC case 6474, paras. 2–3, in van den Berg 2000, 281; see Waincymer 2012, 8–9. 
188 See Waincymer 2012, 8–9. 
189 Emphasis added. Paulsson 2005, 604. 
190 Walters 2012, 662–663. 
41 
 
judicial review (instead, being treated like other substantive issues in the arbitration)”.191 
However, controversially, Born also incorporates an opposite formulation by stating that “these 
[pre-arbitration procedural] requirements […] are best suited for resolution by arbitral tribunals, 
subject to minimal judicial review, like other procedural decisions”.192 
The reasoning for considering admissibility as a substantive issue may be that material decisions 
are not reviewable by courts and thus, due to the non-reviewable nature of admissibility issues, 
admissibility would necessarily be a substantive matter.193 However, one cannot completely 
equate the concepts of procedural and jurisdictional either. Procedural aspects of arbitration are 
considerably wider than only questions of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. They comprise a number 
of different aspects of the arbitral proceedings such as deadlines, submission of evidence, 
appointment of arbitrators etc. Still, the possibility to a court review does not in principle (with 
the exemption of the possibility to challenge the award on the basis of the very limited 
procedural grounds such as violation of the party’s right to be heard) concern other procedural 
decisions than those about the tribunal’s jurisdiction.194 Thus, procedural issues should be 
considered competent to include also issues that do not require the indispensable opportunity 
for a review. 
Another possible reasoning behind presupposing admissibility issues as substantive may be that 
because admissibility is often closely connected to the merits of the case,195 there would be a 
justified ground to consider it as belonging to the merits. Nevertheless, although closely 
connected, the grounds for inadmissibility are still independent of the substantive grounds upon 
which a claim is to be adjudicated on the merits.196 Indeed, admissibility deals with the claim’s 
                                               
191 Emphasis added. Born 2014, 1190. 
192 Emphasis added. Born 2014, 939. Born also defines that admissibility defenses refer to situations where the 
arbitration agreement provides jurisdiction but does not permit assertion of substantive claims until after specified 
requirements have been satisfied. Born 2014, 936. Strictly following this definition, it would seem that a challenge 
to admissibility could not itself be substantive in nature. 
193 For example, Walters reasons that “[a]s embodied in the New York Convention and in many states' arbitration 
laws, state courts will refrain from conducting a substantive review of the merits of a dispute when a party seeks 
annulment, recognition, or enforcement of an arbitral award. Consequently, courts do not have the authority to 
review a tribunal's findings on issues related to a dispute's merits, such as admissibility challenges”. Walters 2012, 
663. 
194 Similarly, see Born 2014, 941. 
195 Walters 2012, 663; Douglas 2009, 148; see Fitzmaurice 1986, 438, fn. 6; see ICC case 6474, paras. 58, 62, in 
van den Berg 2000, 290–291. In Enron v. Argentina (2004) the ICSID tribunal stated that a successful admissibility 
objection would normally result in rejecting a claim for reasons connected with the merits (para. 33).  
196 Douglas 2009, 148; ICC case 6474, para. 62, in van den Berg 2000, 291 (“It cannot be denied that […] procedural 
status and substantive ownership of the claim may be difficult to distinguish […] contemporary legal doctrine 
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suitability for consideration on the merits,197 and thus cannot pertain to the merits itself. 
Moreover, the typical situations of admissibility relate to matters that seem virtually to have a 
rather procedural nature, such as issues of timeliness and fulfillment of procedural pre-
conditions. 
Especially the US courts have incorporated a different use of words than the above-cited authors 
when discussing admissibility. In Town Cove Jersey v. Procida the court noted that “[w]hether 
or not a condition precedent to arbitration has been satisfied is a procedural matter for the 
arbitrator to decide”.198 Similarly, the court in Langlais v. Pennmont stated that “procedural 
questions, such as those concerning […] the procedural prerequisites to arbitration, are for the 
arbitrator to decide”.199 Furthermore, in Wiley v. Livingston the court held that “[o]nce it is 
determined, as we have, that the parties are obligated to submit the subject matter of a dispute 
to arbitration, “procedural” questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final 
disposition should be left to the arbitrator”.200 
The same position was adopted also in ICC case 6474. The ICC tribunal submitted that a 
distinction must be drawn between the field of “quality to act”, which is connected to 
admissibility, and the “legitimacy to act” which relates to the merits.201 By referring to Professor 
Habscheid, the tribunal concluded that the question of “quality to act” is a notion 
of procedural law, and that such a characterization would result in an application to the problem 
of the law of Switzerland, seat of the Arbitral Tribunal.202 Interestingly, however, as the tribunal 
found that under Swiss law it had a wide discretion with regard to both the characterization of 
the question and of the choice of the applicable law, it ended up submitting that “[e]ven if the 
                                               
generally considers that the right to bring proceedings is a distinct and independent notion from the substantive 
right which it is supposed to defend or protect”). Similarly, Fitzmaurice stated that “an objection to the substantive 
admissibility of a claim […] is a plea that the tribunal should rule the claim to be inadmissible on some ground 
other than its ultimate merits” and that “[t]he term [ultimate merits] is used because often a preliminary objection 
[…] is connected with, and not entirely without relevance to, the substantive merits, and it is often more closely 
related to these than purely jurisdictional issues” (emphasis added). Fitzmaurice 1986, 438 and fn. 6. 
197 Douglas 2009, 148. 
198 Emphasis added. Town Cove Jersey v. Procida (1996) in Born 2014, 939, fn. 1595. 
199 Emphasis added. Langlais v. Pennmont (2013) in Born 2014, 939, fn. 1596. 
200 Emphasis added. Wiley v. Livingston (1964), 557. Similarly, with reference to Wiley v. Livingston, see Howsam 
v. Dean Witter Reynolds (2002), 84. 
201 ICC case 6474, paras. 58–59, in van den Berg 2000, 290–291. The difference between these two was considered 
to be that the absence of the first element leads the judge to declare the claim inadmissible without further 
examination, while the absence of the second element will lead to a decision recognizing the claim as admissible 
but unfounded. 
202 ICC case 6474, para. 60, see also paras. 2–3. 
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question under examination must be characterized as procedural, it would appear advisable to 
take into consideration, if not to ‘apply' in the strict sense of the term, the law of the European 
country”.203 Nevertheless, the tribunal seemed to accept that admissibility issues should be 
classified as procedural.  
It can be concluded that admissibility issues have close connections to the merits of the case and 
their distinction is not always clear or easy to make. Indeed, admissibility seems to possess a 
mixed or hybrid character regarding its nature as a substantive or procedural matter.204 Also, the 
treatment of admissibility issues differs considerably from the treatment of jurisdictional issues 
(in particular in the sense of reviewability) that are perhaps the most central procedural issues 
in arbitration. However, admissibility should still be considered pertain to procedural issues in 
arbitration. This seems meaningful because when making a decision on admissibility, the 
tribunal is not yet defining the parties’ substantive rights and obligations but just determining 
what claims the parties have intended to be suitable for consideration. As a consequence, the 
same laws and rules should be applied to the admissibility question than to other procedural 
matters in the arbitral proceedings.205 
3.5 Conclusions 
International tribunals, national courts as well as highly valued legal commentaries sometimes 
fail to notice admissibility as a basis for a claim’s dismissal. They have either confused 
admissibility with other legal concepts (most commonly jurisdiction) or rejected the relevance 
of the separation of different preliminary challenges altogether. Nevertheless, the notions of 
admissibility and jurisdiction are fundamentally different and understanding the difference 
between the concepts and maintaining their distinction as clear as possible is not only a technical 
issue but a matter of considerable concrete importance. Better recognizing the possible 
                                               
203 ICC case 6474, para. 63. As a reasoning the tribunal submitted that: “not only or mainly because both Parties 
have referred to it at great length, but also because, to the extent that the objection of inadmissibility is based on 
the relationship between the claimant and the European country export insurance system, the provisions of the law 
of the European country are undoubtedly relevant”.  
204 ICC case 6474, para. 62. 
205 This is supported by Heiskanen’s submission that “[n]o substantive choice of law issues can arise, as a practical 
matter, before it has been determined that the particular dispute in question falls under the court’s jurisdiction, 
and/or that the claim is admissible”. Heiskanen 2010, 447. Following this apprehension, it would seem inevitable 
that, as the substantive law applicable to the underlying contract may be determined only after the preliminary 
issues including admissibility have been decided, the admissibility issue is governed by the same rules applicable 
to determination of jurisdiction. 
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applications of the concept of admissibility and providing parties, tribunals and courts with a 
clarified standard of how to classify different challenges would promote greater predictability 
in the resolution of international disputes.206 
In order to establish whether a particular challenge pertains to jurisdiction or admissibility, a 
valuable premise test that should be applied is whether the ground for the challenge is targeted 
at the tribunal or the claim, i.e. whether it gives reasons to question the tribunal as the correct 
forum (jurisdictional issue) or the claim’s ability to suffice for judicial determination 
(admissibility issue). When making a decision on admissibility the tribunal is already exercising 
its jurisdiction and therefore, in order to be competent to rule a claim (in)admissible, the tribunal 
needs to first be convinced that it has jurisdiction. Subsequently, should the claim be found 
inadmissible, the tribunal is prevented from proceeding to the merits. Thus, dismissing a claim 
on the basis of inadmissibility is a different type of decision than rejecting the claim either on 
the basis of lack of jurisdiction or later on the merits.  
One of the most important consequences of classifying an issue as of admissibility is the finality 
of the tribunal’s decision. It follows from the finality that the decision may not be reviewed by 
a court but is in this regard treated similarly to decisions on merits (see Figure 2 below). Thus, 
if the tribunal makes an incorrect finding on whether the claim was admissible, it is not possible 
to appeal the decision. Instead, the parties carry the risk of the tribunal’s competence to reach 
the right conclusion. This is something the parties should bear in mind when they formulate 
their preliminary objections and decide whether they want to reason that their objection goes 
against jurisdiction or admissibility.207 Moreover, the arbitral tribunal should not by its own 
motion consider the claim’s admissibility, but in case the party has not alleged that the claim is 
inadmissible it should rather consider that the party has waived the possibility to raise such 
objection. 
 
  
                                               
206 In the context of res judicata, see Walters 2012, 664–665. 
207 See Gouiffés – Ordonez 2015, 121. 
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Figure 2 – An illustration of the differing legal consequences following the characterization of an issue 
either as jurisdictional and as of admissibility. 
 
Perhaps the most typical situations of inadmissibility concern timeliness issues, noncompliance 
with procedural condition precedents and failure to exhaust local remedies. However, the 
grounds for inadmissibility recognized by several authors and decisions rendered by courts and 
tribunals should not by any means be considered as an exhaustive list of possible situations of 
inadmissibility. Determining such an exhaustive list would presumably not be even possible as 
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the grounds for inadmissibility and their availability may vary from case to case.208 Indeed, also 
Paulsson submits that specific applications of the concept of admissibility may be subject to 
discussion.209 In the following chapter we are opening the discussion in regards of preliminary 
objections against claims on contract adaptation. 
                                               
208 See Amerasinghe 2011, 97. 
209 Paulsson 2005, 617; similarly, Gouiffés – Ordonez 2015, 121. 
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4 Contract Adaptation by Arbitrators – A Question of 
Jurisdiction or Admissibility? 
4.1 Introduction 
As was discussed earlier in the second chapter, contract adaptation by arbitral tribunals includes 
two parallel dimensions, procedural and substantive, which both need to permit adaptation in 
order to the tribunal to be enabled to adapt the contract. The substantive side of the issue 
concerns whether the parties’ agreement or the applicable contract law provides for adaptation 
and whether the requirements for the adaptation have been met in the particular situation. 
However, before the tribunal may proceed to the merits and decide whether the contract should 
be adapted (and how it should be adapted), the tribunal needs to possess the procedural authority 
to consider such claim in the first place. The various commentaries addressing the issue of 
contract adaptation in arbitration seek to establish whether and under which circumstances an 
arbitral tribunal may possess such powers. In this regard, they seem to treat the issue as of 
jurisdiction; whether the tribunal has the jurisdiction to adapt the parties’ contract. However, in 
light of the above-discussed characteristics of jurisdictional issues (especially the possibility to 
try the claim in a court if the tribunal is found to lack jurisdiction), it seems to me that 
characterizing the available preliminary objections exclusively as jurisdictional is made too 
easily. 
Could a claim that requires the tribunal to exceed the powers that are conferred upon it by the 
parties be instead found inadmissible? This type of sub-category (demand for excess of powers) 
of inadmissibility grounds perhaps differs quite a bit from the traditional admissibility situations 
discussed in the previous chapter, but in any case, the possibility of invoking an admissibility 
challenge against a claim on contract adaptation should be at least noticed and after a careful 
examination either accepted or abandoned. In such scenario that a claim on adaptation would be 
found inadmissible, the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal would be confirmed and that would 
move the issue of the tribunal’s procedural authority away from the battle between courts and 
arbitrators. Then, when the tribunal’s powers to adapt the contract would be contested, the aim 
would instead be at finding the claim defective altogether. 
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The arbitrating parties should have it clear it their mind what is the consequence they are seeking 
the arbitral tribunal to render at the end of the proceedings. They should carefully examine what 
the intended effect is (whether they are objecting the tribunal or the claim) and reason their cases 
accordingly. Thus, they need to be aware of the different positions available for them and make 
a conscious choice of how to build their arguments before the tribunal.210 Should excess of the 
arbitrators’ powers be accepted as a cause for inadmissibility, the respondent would be granted 
with an additional ground for resisting the claimant’s claim on adaptation. Indeed, classifying 
the challenge as of admissibility may, depending on the particular case, leave less gaps in the 
respondent’s argumentation thus potentially supporting its case better than arguing that the 
tribunal does not at all have jurisdiction in the case.211 Moreover, as a negative decision on 
admissibility does not permit the claimant to try the claim in a court but the matter is resolved 
finally, generally it would be more efficient for the respondent who is seeking to resist the 
adaptation at any grounds to argue that the claim was inadmissible rather than that the tribunal 
lacks jurisdiction.212 Hence, the recognition of the admissibility as an alternative nature of the 
objection to the claim on adaptation could affect the parties’ argumentation when reasoning 
their positions. 
4.2 Adaptation as a Jurisdictional Issue 
4.2.1 Objections to Arbitrability of the Claim on Adaptation  
The question of whether a contract can be adapted by the arbitrators can be viewed at two 
different levels: (i) arbitrability level since it has to be established whether the adaptation of 
contract is a dispute that can be submitted to arbitration and (ii) determination of the arbitrators’ 
procedural powers in the individual case.213 Therefore, a jurisdictional challenge may be based 
either on an allegation that under the applicable laws adaptation of the contract does not qualify 
                                               
210 Similarly, see Gouiffés – Ordonez 2015, 121. 
211 See the illustration of the Vis Moot problem in Chapter 1.1. 
212 This could be the case for example in a situation where the party is resisting the tribunal’s procedural authority 
to adapt the contract although the contract includes an express arbitration clause.  
 On the other hand, of course, the respondent will not have the opportunity to appeal the tribunal’s decision in 
case the tribunal concluded that the claim is admissible. However, the finality of the tribunal’s decision is one of 
the reasons why parties resort to arbitration in the first place, and thus the respondent should not be unwilling to 
propose the argument due to the fear of non-reviewability of the decision. Moreover, the respondent could also opt 
for a strategy where it first objects the tribunal’s jurisdiction and, if the tribunal would not accept the objection, 
argue as an alternative ground that the claim is inadmissible. 
213 Ferrario 2017, 75; Beisteiner 2014b, 79. 
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as arbitration i.e. it is not arbitrable or that in casu under the particular arbitration agreement the 
tribunal does not have the power to adapt the contract (i.e. the parties’ have not authorized it to 
do so).214 This chapter focuses on the first level whereas the second level is discussed in the 
following chapter. 
Where the challenge is based on non-arbitrability of the adaptation claim (bearing in mind the 
above-discussed limited area of non-arbitrable matters and tendency to permit adaptation by 
arbitration among states215) it seems that the issue necessary concerns the arbitrators’ 
jurisdiction. Thus, the nature of such objection is always jurisdictional and there is no room for 
alternative speculation of whether the issue could pertain to admissibility. This results firstly 
from the feature that arbitrability issues deal with the relationship between arbitrators and courts. 
Indeed, arbitrability involves determining which types of disputes may be resolved by 
arbitration and which belong exclusively to the domain of the courts.216 A matter is determined 
non-arbitrable if the state wants to keep the monopoly of adjudication in that area.217 Therefore, 
if an issue is non-arbitrable the automatic consequence is that the courts may resolve the matter. 
On the other hand, one could argue that arbitrability objections target the challenge in particular 
at the claim and not at the arbitral tribunal. Consequently, applying Paulsson’s test there could 
be grounds for considering the challenge to in fact concern admissibility. However, this does 
not seem meaningful but arbitrability needs to be distinguished from non-adjudicability. 
Therefore, accepting that claims on adaptation can be challenged on the basis of arbitrability 
inevitably assumes that national courts are competent to adapt contracts.218 This is another 
unsettled issue which deserves to be discussed separately (see Chapter 4.2.4). 
The second ground for considering arbitrability challenges necessarily pertaining to 
jurisdictional issues (and not to admissibility) is the rule according to which a recourse against 
                                               
214 Beisteiner 2014b, 79; generally about different grounds for challenging jurisdiction see Redfern – Hunter 2015, 
338 (“The grounds for a challenge to jurisdiction are often related to the basic elements of arbitration clauses, […] 
it may be argued […] that the whole dispute in issue is outside the scope of the arbitration agreement, or not 
arbitrable under the applicable law.”). 
215 See Chapters 2.2 and 3.3.1. 
216 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 110. 
217 See Beisteiner 2014b, 97.  
218 According to Beisteiner “[t]he traditional view, posited not least by the Austrian Supreme Court, is that only 
(but – arguably – at least) such dispute resolution which would in the absence of an arbitration agreement fall within 
the competence of the state courts can qualify as arbitration. The “legal dispute” which is to be “decided” by the 
arbitrator must potentially (i.e. in the absence of an arbitration agreement) lead to a state court decision”, emphasis 
partially ommitted. Beisteiner 2014b, 87. 
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the award in court is permissible if the dispute is not arbitrable. According to Art. 34(2)(b) of 
the Model Law an arbitral award may be set aside by the court if the court finds that: (i) the 
subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of this 
State; or (ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of this State. These two grounds 
cannot be totally separated but the arbitrability of a dispute is usually linked to the underlying 
public policy of the state in which the arbitration takes place.219 The New York Convention 
contains a similar provision in Art. V(2) which provides that non-arbitrability and violation of 
public policy form a basis for refusing the recognition and enforcement of the award.220 As was 
discussed before, such recourse to courts would not be available in cases of admissibility and a 
decision on an issue that is characterised as of admissibility does not fall under any ground of 
Art. 34 of the Model Law or Art. V of the New York Convention.221 
4.2.2 Arbitrators’ “Power” to Adapt a Contract  
Now we turn to the second level of the issue. Whether in an individual case the arbitrators are 
procedurally authorized to decide a claim on contract adaptation is often considered to be 
concerned with the arbitral tribunal’s “power” to adapt the contract. Indeed, many commentators 
do not address the question of the tribunal’s authority to adapt a contract by expressly talking 
about the arbitrators’ jurisdiction but rather tend to adopt the word “power”.222 However, due to 
its generality the word is quite uninformative. It may be used to describe what someone is 
entitled or authorized to do but its usage is not limited to any particular legal issue (unlike when 
applying the term jurisdiction when one is automatically discussing the tribunal’s fundamental 
legitimacy to act that forms a basis of the whole arbitral proceedings). Indeed, it seems that 
                                               
219 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 586. 
220 However, it should be noted that under the New York Convention the law according to which the adaptation 
would have to be non-arbitrable is the law of the enforcing country. See Born 2014, 3702–3703. Thus, the law is 
different than under the Model Law which refers to the law of the place of arbitration.  
 Cf. Stalev who purports that the New York Convention does not apply to awards adapting contracts. He submits 
that this does not mean, however, that those awards cannot be recognized abroad but instead it means their broader 
recognition. This is because they form an integral part of the contract and thereby they are to be recognized abroad 
as the contract itself (and thus also in countries not party to the New York Convention). Hence, only in a state, 
which not only forbids the adaptation of contract by arbitration but also regards such a prohibition as a provision 
of its public policy would the recognition of awards adapting contracts be refused. Stalev 1983, 208. 
221 See Chapter 3.4.2. 
222 See e.g. Beisteiner 2014b, 107 et seqq.; Berger 2001, 7 et seqq.; Ferrario 2017, 74 et seqq.; Brunner 2009, 490 
et seqq; Kröll 2004, 456 et seqq.; Frick 2001, 190 et seqq.; Bordacahar 2018; Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 652; 
Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 114–115. 
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“power” may be used either interchangeably with jurisdiction223 or as referring to some powers 
that already presuppose the tribunal’s jurisdiction in the case. For example, the term is generally 
applied when referring to the powers that enable the arbitral tribunal to carry out its task properly 
and effectively such as the powers to order production of documents, to appoint experts, to hold 
hearings and to require the presence of witnesses.224 These powers do not affect what kind of 
decisions the tribunal is competent to render but merely provide it with tools for conducting the 
proceedings. Thus, the term is relatively broad and does not possess a certain specific legal 
meaning or consequences.225 In the same vein, it does not in itself reveal, for example, whether 
the discussed issue relates to jurisdiction or admissibility but may be arguably used to address 
them both (and for this reason the word is found useful to be utilized occasionally also in this 
study.) 
Nevertheless, although several authors choose to utilize the word “power” when discussing the 
issue of whether a tribunal is procedurally entitled to adapt a contract, it seems that they still 
treat the question as a matter of jurisdiction. Thus, they consider the words to be interchangeable. 
For example, while Beisteiner deals with the issue by incorporating the word “power”, she still 
reveals to be talking about the tribunal’s jurisdiction by submitting that “if interpretation of the 
arbitration clause demonstrates that the arbitrator in casu was not conferred the power to revise 
the contract, an arbitral award revising the contract will be challengeable even if it keeps within 
the confines of substantive law”.226 Also Brunner equates the terms by submitting that “it may 
still be arguable whether an arbitral tribunal has the procedural power, i.e., the jurisdiction, to 
                                               
223 See e.g. Brunner 2009, 493 (“it may still be arguable whether an arbitral tribunal has the procedural power, i.e., 
the jurisdiction, to adapt a contract”, emphasis added); Park 2007, 153 (“The labels applied to excess of authority 
may vary from country to country, with related terms (“jurisdiction,” “authority,” “powers,” and “mission”) often 
pressed into service almost interchangeably”); Redfern – Hunter 2015, 306 (“The powers […] of an arbitral tribunal 
are also closely linked to the question of its jurisdiction (particularly in defining the extent of that jurisdiction) and 
the difficult question of determining the validity of the arbitration agreement”). 
224 See Redfern – Hunter 2015, 306 et seqq; see Jarvin 1987, 55–58. This is the meaning in which also the Model 
Law operates with the term “power”. See Arts. 17 (power to order interim measures) and 19(2) (power to conduct 
the arbitration in a manner the tribunal considers appropriate and power to determine the admissibility, relevance, 
materiality and weight of any evidence). Cf. Art. 16 (Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction) 
located under Chapter IV that is titled “Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal”. On the other hand, the ground for a 
challenge under Art. 34 has been considered to be concerned with the excess of the tribunal’s powers, which again 
implies that the word is understood interchangeably with jurisdiction. See e.g. Redfern – Hunter 2015, 584–585. 
225 Notably, for example, the New York Convention does not contain the word “power” even once. 
226 Emphasis partially omitted. Beisteiner 2014b, 113. 
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adapt a contract when the substantive law requirements of the hardship test are met”.227 
Furthermore, similarly to Beisteiner, he also purports that “[a]n award providing for adaptation 
rendered by an arbitral tribunal that lacks jurisdiction to do so could be challenged and set aside 
under the lex arbitri, and may not be enforceable under the New York Convention”.228  
Also Berger talks about tribunals’ powers to adapt contracts in the context of jurisdiction as he 
stipulates that “[…] the question remains whether arbitral tribunals are procedurally authorized 
to make such decisions. Some arbitration acts, such as the Dutch Act, Bulgarian Act, or the new 
Swedish Arbitration Act provide for such a jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal where the parties 
have expressly authorized it to do so”.229 Berger does not separate clearly the issues of the first 
and second level i.e. the arbitrability level and, shall we call it, the ad hoc level. Nevertheless, 
what he seems to mean is that under those laws the tribunal’s factual jurisdiction as a matter of 
the second level (right to act in casu) follows from the combined effect of the arbitration 
agreement and the lex arbitri.230 
Arbitrators’ power to adapt contracts has been considered to be an issue of jurisdiction also in 
case law.231 For example, in Aminoil v. Kuwait the arbitral tribunal considered that the question 
of whether it had the power to complete an imcomplete contract required “considering whether 
it has jurisdiction to go into the matter”.232 Also, in NV Belgische v. NV Distrigas the Swiss 
Supreme Court held that the power to fill gaps or amend a contract is a matter of jurisdiction 
and that as such, an arbitral tribunal’s decision to amend the parties’ agreement can be 
challenged on the basis that the tribunal wrongly assumed jurisdiction.233  
                                               
227 Emphasis added. Brunner 2009, 493. Similarly, in the context of arbitrators’ power to fill gaps, Debevoise 
considered in 1976 that “[o]nce it is decided that the underlying agreement is valid, the focus shifts to the scope of 
the arbitrator’s power. […] when one party objects that a particular gap sought to be filled exceeds the bounds of 
the submission agreement, the arbitrator will consider that jurisdictional question itself”, emphasis added. 
Debevoise 1976, 127. 
228 Emphasis added. Brunner 2009, 493. 
229 Emphasis added. Berger 2003, 1373. 
230 See Berger 2001, 10. 
Similarly, Redfern – Hunter 2015, 342 (“jurisdiction itself is derived […] from the arbitration agreement – and the 
arbitration agreement can confer only powers that are permissible under the law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement and under the lex arbitri”). 
231 However, the published case law on this topic is sparse. Brunner 2009, 452. 
232 Aminoil v. Kuwait (1982), paras. 71, 73. 
233 NV Belgische v. NV Distrigas (2001), referenced in Nessi 2017; see also Intrafor Cofor v. Gagnant (1985), 
referenced in Ferrario 2017, 140. 
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4.2.3 Possibility to Challenge the Award on the Ground of Excess of Jurisdiction 
If the question of the tribunal’s power to adapt a contract is classified as a matter of jurisdiction, 
the respondent refusing the adaptation could seek the award to be set aside or refused recognition 
and enforcement on the basis that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction. In such situation the 
available ground for the challenge or refusal is provided for by Art. V(1)(c) of the New York 
Convention (and respectively Arts. 34(2)(a)(iii) and 36(1)(a)(iii) of the Model Law). According 
to Art. V(1)(c) recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused if the award deals with 
a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, 
or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. The article 
thus envisages a situation in which the arbitral tribunal is alleged to have acted in excess of its 
authority and to have dealt with a dispute that was not submitted to it.234 To be exact, in this 
regard the excess of authority (or respectively excess of power) means specifically excess of 
jurisdiction.235 
Notably, a challenge under the ground that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction does not entail 
that the resisting party contests that the parties had validly agreed on arbitration.236 Indeed, it 
has been submitted that this ground contemplates a situation in which an award has been made 
by a tribunal that did have jurisdiction to deal with the dispute, but which exceeded its powers 
by dealing with matters that had not been submitted to it and rendered an award it was not 
entitled to make.237 Thus, it recognizes that the parties did in principle agree on arbitration as 
the correct forum for the dispute resolution; the tribunal indeed possesses the general jurisdiction 
to solve the disputes arising out of the parties’ agreement – but not to do what it has in the 
particular case done, such as changed the contract.  
An allegation under Art. V(1)(c) that the tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction may be of two 
kinds: either that a decision is taken on remedies not requested by a party or that a claim is 
                                               
234 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 630. 
235 See Redfern – Hunter 2015, 629; see Born 2014, 110; see Santacroce 2017, 567. 
236 If the party wished to resist the tribunal’s jurisdiction altogether it would need to rely on Art. V(1)(a), which 
concerns incapacity of the parties and invalidity of the arbitration agreement. Van den Berg 1981, 312. 
237 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 584; van den Berg 1981, 312; Moses 2008, 195. 
 However, it can be pointed out that if the whole dispute concerns whether the contract should be adapted or not 
and the tribunal was not granted with the jurisdiction to decide claims on adaptation, it is hard to imagine that the 
tribunal would have any jurisdiction to deal with that dispute. 
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outside the scope of the arbitration agreement.238 The first type of allegation is based on the 
mandate given by the parties in the course of the proceedings whereas the second type is based 
on the arbitration agreement itself.239 The relevance of this separation is that the mandate may 
comprise less than the arbitration agreement.240 An example of a situation where the tribunal 
went beyond the mandate given by the parties is provided by Paris Lapeyre v. Sauvage  where 
the Paris Court of Appeals found that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by awarding a party 
damages in an amount that significantly exceeded the damages claimed.241 Regarding claims on 
contract adaptation the claimant has, however, likely initiated the arbitration precisely in order 
to have the contract adapted by the tribunal on the basis of a hardship clause or a relevant 
regulatory provision. Therefore, the allegation that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction because 
it adapted the contract without a party’s request hardly comes into play.242 
A challenge against an award adapting a contract would thus rather be based on an allegation of 
the second type i.e. that the claim requesting adaptation was outside the scope of the arbitration 
agreement.243 As was discussed before, jurisdictional issues deal with the relationship between 
arbitration and courts meaning that if the tribunal is found to have exceeded its jurisdiction by 
adapting the contract, the power to adapt the contract falls on the courts. In other words, if the 
                                               
238 Van den Berg 1981, 314; Liebscher 2003, 305; Born 2014, 3545. 
239 Van den Berg 1981, 314. 
240 Van den Berg 1981, 314. 
241 Paris Lapeyre v. Sauvage (2001), referenced in Redfern – Hunter 2015, 584. 
242 Such allegation could be successful in a situation where the tribunal adapted the parties’ contract even though 
the aggrieved party had requested termination of the contract and the other party merely requested the tribunal to 
dismiss the claim. Alternatively, it could be valid if the adaptation rendered by the tribunal goes in extent or 
monetary amount beyond what was requested by the party. For this reason, the party requesting the adaptation 
should be required to reasonably substantiate the contents of the requested modification. A generic request pursuant 
to which a party simply asks the court to determine an adequate adaptation may not be sufficient. Brunner 2009, 
503. 
243 Should the parties have included a standard arbitration clause in their agreement (which stipulates something 
like “all disputes arising out of or relating to this agreement shall be resolved in arbitration”), the unclear issue is 
whether such traditional arbitration clause can be interpreted in such a wide manner that it covers the adaptation of 
contracts. See Berger 2001, 8. In such situation a party could contest the tribunal’s jurisdiction by alleging that an 
express authorization in the arbitration agreement or in the hardship clause would have been required in order to 
authorize the tribunal to adapt the contract. For example, in ICC case 7544 (1999) the parties had authorized the 
tribunal to decide on “all disputes arising out of the contract including a change of the contract itself”. By contrast, 
in ICC case 5754 (1988) the tribunal held that the traditional ICC arbitration clause may be interpreted as covering 
the adaptation of contracts if the clause is contained in a long-term contract that contains “a number of provisions 
which may require adjustment over the period of that contract”. Therefore, a specific authorization was not required 
for adaptation. However, the tribunal emphasized that in other contexts the standard ICC arbitration agreement 
might be given a narrower scope. 
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challenge is successful, the consequence is that the dispute on the adaptation may be 
subsequently brought before a court.244 
4.2.4 Relation to Courts’ Jurisdiction to Adapt Contracts 
As just discussed, one of the characteristics of jurisdictional issues is that they deal with the 
relationship between arbitration and courts. This means that if the tribunal lacks jurisdiction, the 
automatic consequence is that then the state courts are authorized to resolve the case. 
Respectively, in order to classify the challenge to the tribunal’s power to adapt a contract as 
jurisdictional, it would be inevitable that the courts were entitled to adapt contracts. However, 
it should be critically reviewed whether the courts would be entitled to adapt the contact either.  
State courts’ powers to adapt contracts are not undisputed but there is a strong sentiment that 
judges do not make contracts.245 Notably, what used to be the primary concern of the working 
group on the Model Law against arbitrators adapting contracts, was namely “the position of 
many legal systems according to which the courts are not allowed to adapt or supplement 
contracts”.246 However, Beisteiner submits that since then this concern has been dispelled and 
that scholars increasingly speak out in favor of a more progressive stance on contract adaptation 
and the resistance appears to be gradually subsiding.247 Nevertheless, she recognizes that there 
may still be some way to go until contract adaptation will be openly accepted as a state court 
competence.248 Thus, it depends on the particular judicial system whether courts are authorized 
to adapt contracts.249 In some countries the courts have such power either by virtue of a statute 
                                               
244 Redfern – Hunter 2015, 606; Moses 2008, 199. 
245 Beisteiner 2014a; see Brunner 2009, 494 (“It is also suggested that the creation (or adaptation) of contractual 
rights should be reserved for the parties themselves, while courts and arbitral tribunals should be limited to 
adjudicate pre-existing rights”, emphasis added), 509 (“This position is particularly based on the argument that the 
courts should in general not be allowed to intervene in the contract (primacy of the principle of party autonomy), 
and that the adaptation of the terms of the contract by the court has the inherent danger that courts might make 
excessive use of their powers and inappropriately ‘rewrite’ the contract.”); see Schmitthoff 1980, 415 et seqq.; see 
Szurski 1984, 67 (”[…] exceed the limits of the competence of ordinary courts, which, as a rule, cannot create 
contractual relations between the disputing parties”, emphasis added); see Wolfgang 1995, 251 (“Regarding the 
situation in France, courts are not allowed to adapt contract terms”). 
246 UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/AP.44, Art. 7, para. 14, cited in Beisteiner 2014b, 94. 
247 Beisteiner 2014b, 93–94, see references in fn. 73.  
248 Beisteiner 2014b, 94. 
249 For example, in 1980 Schmitthoff submitted that “[w]e have seen that, in the present state of authorities, the 
English courts have no power to adapt a contract to uncontemplated fundamental changes, even if the parties so 
desire”. Thus, if the parties wished to have their contract adapted they would have had to opt for a foreign legal 
system which admits the adaptation of contracts. Schmitthoff 1980, 420–421. 
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or by virtue of their inherent jurisdiction.250 For example, it has been submitted that state courts 
are necessarily given the procedural power to adapt a contract in those legal systems where the 
adaptation of the contract as a possible legal consequence is recognized as a matter of 
substantive law.251 
Let us first consider a situation where in a particular country courts generally possess jurisdiction 
to adapt contracts. Then, if the applicable arbitration law is silent on whether arbitrators may 
adapt contracts, one could be guided by the principle of synchronized competencies according 
to which the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is (with the exception of non-arbitrable subject matters) 
considered to be aligned to the jurisdiction of the state courts.252 Following this principle, if the 
courts are empowered to adapt contracts arbitral tribunals should have the same authority.253 In 
turn, if the applicable arbitration law would require an express authorization by the parties in 
order to authorize arbitrators to adapt the contract and no such authorization was given, the 
tribunal would lack the authority and the claim on adaptation would allegedly fall upon the 
jurisdiction of the courts. In that case, it would be assumed that the parties’ intention was that 
potential adaptation claims were to be resolved by a court and other claims by the tribunal.254 In 
such scenario, characterizing the challenge as jurisdictional would be correct. However, the 
characterization becomes more problematic in situations where the particular legal order does 
not grant state courts with the power to adapt contracts.  
The principle of synchronized competencies has been expressed also in the negative so that if 
the courts are not provided with the power to adapt contracts, an arbitrator applying the law of 
that jurisdiction does not possess that power either.255 Indeed, historically neither courts nor 
arbitrators had the authority to fill gaps or adapt contracts because it did not constitute a judicial, 
or justiciable, act.256 However, there seems to be strong support to the contrary in favor of the 
                                               
250 Schmitthoff 1980, 416. 
251 Brunner 2009, 495. Noteworthy, the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL provide for adaptation by a court. 
See Art. 6.2.3(4)(b) of the UNIDROIT Principles and Art. 6:111(3)(b) of the PECL. 
252 Beisteiner 2014b, 87; Brunner 2009, 495; Berger 2001, 10; Brower 2016, 18. 
253 Bernardini 1983, 214; Berger 2001, 10; Brunner 2009, 495; Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, 29; Ferrario 
2017, 75–76. 
254 Whether such conclusion is reasonable and justified is discussed later in Chapter 4.3.2. 
255 Schmitthoff 1980, 420–421; Ferrario 2017, 76. 
256 Brower 2016, 18; see Beisteiner 2014b, 54 (“The judicial act is being contrasted with the (exclusively) creative 
act. Under this view […] [j]ust as a state court judge, the arbitrator just interprets but does not create or shape 
contracts”, emphasis added). 
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position that arbitrators may have wider powers than courts. For example, Beisteiner argues that 
“even if and when the state court’s powers to revise a contract would and do end, an arbitral 
tribunal may validly and enforceably revise the contract. The proposition is that an arbitrator’s 
powers, in general, and an arbitrator's power to revise contracts, in particular, may go beyond 
that of a state court judge”.257 Thus, the parties could, with the exclusion of non-arbitrable 
matters, empower the arbitrators to decide and to grant remedies even if such are not available 
to the state court judge.258  
Similarly, already in 1985 René David submitted that “[a]rbitration is not only resorted to for 
the settlement of a legal dispute, but it may also be used in order to settle questions which are 
outside the jurisdiction of the courts, or which the courts are not well equipped to answer. The 
arbitrator is not always called to interpret the contract […] he may be asked to perfect an 
agreement which is incomplete or called to vary the contractual terms”.259 Also during the 
drafting of the Model Law it was recognized that “the mere fact that arbitration is to the 
exclusion of court competence does necessarily mean that the competence of the arbitral tribunal 
cannot be wider than the (excluded) competence of the court”.260 One indication of this is the 
power of the arbitrator to decide ex aequo et bono or as amiables compositeur (expressly 
recognized in Art. 28(3) of the Model Law) if so conferred by the parties. Such power can be 
bestowed only to arbitrators but not state court judges.261 
Additionally, it has been frankly argued that state courts are inappropriate for the task of 
adapting contracts to new circumstances and that thus arbitration based on the parties’ 
agreement is the only practical means to adapt long-term international economic contracts when 
                                               
257 Beisteiner 2014b, 96. She further reasons that “[m]oreover, whereas arguably the parties should not engage the 
courts as public resources for the purpose of regulating their private (contractual) relationship, the parties may well 
entrust a privately funded arbitrator with this task of contract revision. Wider arbitral powers do not, basically, give 
rise to an increased spending of public financial resources”. Beisteiner 2014b, 98.  
258 Beisteiner 2014b, 97. 
259 David 1985, 30. Similarly, also Szurski argued in 1984 that “[e]ven if a state court be treated as not being called 
upon to create agreements for and instead of the parties, such position should not by itself prejudice the lack of 
competence of the arbitral tribunal to adapt a contract or to fill its gaps in the case the parties so request. There is a 
substantial difference between the legal ground of the competence of an ordinary court and the competence of the 
arbitral tribunal, the former performing its judicial functions on a statutory basis, while the latter acts exclusively 
on the basis of the agreement of the parties and their mandate. Hence, even in the case the statutory law of a country 
does not foresee the competence of the ordinary court to adapt a contract or to fill gaps in it, on the request of the 
parties, this should not automatically exclude the possibility to perform such function by the arbitral tribunal acting 
within the framework of the will of the parties expressed in the arbitration agreement.” Szurski 1984, 67. 
260 UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.44, Art. 7, para. 17, cited in Berger 2001, 16. 
261 Beisteiner 2014b, 98.  
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the parties are unable to reach an agreed solution.262 In the same vein, precisely if and because 
state courts are not considered appropriate to adapt contracts, the parties must have the 
possibility to entrust arbitrators (that are specifically selected according to their particular 
expertise in special economic fields) with this exercise.263 This conclusion is compatible with 
the fundamental principle of access to justice as despite of the courts’ lack of jurisdiction to 
decide a claim on adaptation the parties would still have the possibility to resort their dispute to 
a third party that is capable of rendering an enforceable decision on the matter.  
Returning to our initial problem, if under the prevailing legal conditions state courts do not have 
jurisdiction to adapt contracts, characterizing a challenge to the tribunal’s power to adapt the 
contract as jurisdictional becomes doubtful. Indeed, if under such circumstances the tribunal 
would find that it did not have the jurisdiction to hear the case (for example on the basis that it 
was not expressly authorized to adapt the contract as required by the lex arbitri), the matter 
could not then fall upon the jurisdiction of the courts either. Instead, it would be left to hang in 
the air without any legal forum that would possess the jurisdiction for its resolution. For this 
reason, it needs to be considered whether in such situation the challenge should rather be 
considered to pertain admissibility. 
4.3 Adaptation as an Admissibility Issue 
4.3.1 Comparing the Power to Adapt a Contract and the Power to Decide Ex Aequo et 
Bono or as Amiable Compositeur  
Adapting the parties’ contract to changed circumstances resembles a situation where the tribunal 
is empowered to decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur. As mentioned above, 
arbitrators’ power to decide a case ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur is recognized in 
Art. 28(3) of the Model Law. An express authorization by the parties is however required. The 
same has been provided for by the national arbitration laws of many countries264, most 
                                               
262 Stalev 1983, 201. Cf. Brower 2016, 18, discussing gap-filling (“as a generalization, one may say that both courts 
and arbitrators have the capacity for gap-filling, and they appear comparably well-suited for the task, subject to a 
pair of qualifications”). 
263 Beisteiner 2014b, 99. 
264 Such as France, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Korea and the New 
Zealand. See Born 2014, 2772, fn. 837; Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 348. 
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institutional arbitration rules265 as well as the ICSID Convention266. It is a controverted issue 
among scholars whether there is difference between giving the arbitrators power to decide ex 
aequo et bono (“in equity”) and as acting as amiable compositeur.267 The issue may also depend 
on the law in effect at the place of arbitration.268 In the light of the purposes of this review, 
however, the potential difference between the two concepts is not analyzed but they are 
generally regarded as meaning the same.269 
Empowering an arbitral tribunal to act ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur means that 
the tribunal may decide the dispute on the basis of principles it believes to be just, without 
having to refer to any particular body of law.270 It means that the arbitrators are not obliged to 
follow strict rules of law but may decide according to the interest of fairness and common 
sense.271 Thus, it is a departure from the ordinary rule and a waiver of the right that the arbitrator 
decides according to the law.272 Consequently, granting the arbitral tribunal with the power to 
decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur gives the tribunal the maximum freedom to 
fashion its decision according to its personal judgment.273 Pursuant to Art. 28(4) of the Model 
Law, even in these cases the tribunal must however decide in accordance with the terms of the 
contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.274 
Nonetheless, it has been submitted that the better view, adopted by a majority of commentators 
and other authorities, is that arbitrators may depart from the terms of the parties’ contract in 
                                               
265 See e.g. Art. 27(3) of the SCC Rules; Art. 29.3 of the FAI Rules; Art. 22.4 of the LCIA Rules; Art. 35(2) of the 
UNCITRAL Rules; Art. 31.2 of the SIAC Rules; Art. 36.2 of the HKIAC Rules; Art. 21(3) of the ICC Rules. 
However, the ICC Rules do not require that the authorization must be express.  
266 See Art. 42(3), which states that “[t]he provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not prejudice the power of the 
Tribunal to decide a dispute ex aequo et bono if the parties so agree.” Notably, the article does not however require 
that the agreement is express. 
267 Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 112, see references in fn. 14; see Born 2014, 2771. 
268 Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 348. For example, in Switzerland ex aequo et bono is understood as meaning the 
application of principles other than legal rules, while the concept of amiable compositeur requires the application 
of legal rules but allows arbitrators to moderate the effect of such rules. Again, in France the two concepts are given 
a similar meaning. Redfern – Hunter 2015, 216–217. 
269 The concepts have been equated also e.g. by Berger (“or having the arbitrators decide as “amiable compositeurs” 
(ex aequo et bono)”). Berger 2003, 1379. In addition, according to Redfern and Hunter, “[a]lthough a historical 
distinction has been drawn between them, the increasing practice of international arbitral tribunals appears to be to 
view both concepts as granting a discretion to arbitral tribunals to put aside strict legal rules and to decide a dispute 
by reference to general principles of fairness”. Redfern – Hunter 2015, 218. 
270 Explanatory Note by the Uncitral Secretariat on the Model Law, 34. 
271 Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 110; Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 471; Born 2014, 2771; Jarvin 1987, 70. 
272 Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 348; Lew – Mistelis – Kröll 2003, 470; Hilgard – Bruder 2014, 54.  
273 Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 113. 
274 Explanatory Note by the Uncitral Secretariat on the Model Law, 34. 
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fashioning a fair and equitable result, provided that they do not rewrite the structure of the 
agreement.275 This view was promoted also during the drafting of the Model Law.276 Thus, it 
seems that empowering the arbitral tribunal to decide the dispute with a mere promise of 
“fairness” grants the tribunal with similar (or arguably even wider) discretion than authorizing 
it to adapt the contract on the basis of a hardship clause or the provisions of the lex causae.277 
Hence, it may be helpful to compare these similar types of “authorizations” in order to define 
whether the power to adapt a contract is necessarily an issue of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.  
Indeed, it can be asked if the issue of whether the arbitral tribunal has the power to decide ex 
aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur is a question of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The answer 
seems on the face of it to be negative as the issue appears to concern “merely” which rules or 
principles the tribunal should adhere to when making its decision (and thus it seems to be a 
choice-of-law matter in a sense). Nevertheless, the question ought to be viewed again from the 
perspectives of (i) the residual jurisdiction of the state courts (available if the tribunal is found 
to lack jurisdiction) and (ii) reviewability of the tribunal’s decision to make a judgment without 
following strict rules of law. The first aspect was already addressed above as it was noted that 
state courts cannot have powers to decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur but 
arbitrators may in this regard be granted with greater authority.278 This notice would support the 
conclusion that the issue cannot concern jurisdiction. 
Relating to the second aspect, Born submits that if an arbitral tribunal decides ex aequo et bono 
without the parties’ agreement granting it such authority, it exposes its award to annulment and 
non-recognition on grounds of excess of authority.279 This denotes the ground under Art. V(1)(c) 
                                               
275 Born 2014, 2775–2776, see references in fn. 858; see ICC case 4206, referenced in Jarvin 1987, 71–72 (where 
the arbitrator reduced the percentage of an agent’s commission although it had been expressly defined in the 
disputed contract). Moreover, it has been specifically submitted that, at least, for example, under the Austrian law 
which does not implement Art. 28(4) of the Model Law, an arbitrator deciding ex aequo et bono or as amiable 
compositeur can deviate from the contract. Beisteiner 2014b, 115–116, see fn. 168. 
276 See the Ninth Session (1976), paras. 179–180. 
277 However, an arbitrator acting as amiable compositeur still may not adapt the terms of the contract without the 
parties’ express authorization. Jarvin 1987, 71, 72. In that regard, the power to decide without adherence to law is 
more limited than the power to adapt the contract. 
 Notably, it has been submitted that the parties should consider whether the promise of “fairness” will in fact 
produce a satisfactory solution, and that virtually all practitioners and businessmen are more skeptical as to the 
ultimate efficiency and fairness of a system that may encourage compromise verdicts or permit entirely arbitrary 
awards. Born 2014, 2776. 
278 See Chapter 4.2.4. 
279 Born 2014, 2773–2774; similarly, Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, 988. 
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of the New York Convention (and Art. 36(1)(a)(iii) of the Model Law) concerning excess of 
jurisdiction.280 Born differentiates the arbitrators’ false choice-of-law decision (which he 
considers as pertaining to the merits and thus to be excluded from review) from their wrongful 
decision to act ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeurs. He submits that “an arbitration ex 
aequo et bono and amiable composition is a different form of proceeding, involving a different 
type of authority, than other types of arbitration; it is not merely an error in application of 
relevant substantive legal rules or interpretation of the parties’ contract or choice-of-law clause. 
An arbitral tribunal’s exercise of such authority, without the parties’ agreement, is an excess of 
authority under Article V(1)(c)”.281  
Therefore, according to Born’s reasoning the question of whether the tribunal has the power to 
decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur would be a question of its jurisdiction. If we 
were to accept this reasoning, the same could analogously be applied also to the tribunal’s 
improper determination that it was authorized it to adapt the contract. Indeed, adaptation and 
rendering a decision ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur can both be said to be a 
different form of proceeding, involving a different type of authority (typically requiring express 
authorization by the parties) and wider discretion than traditional arbitration where the tribunal 
decides the case based on the law and interpretation of the contract.282 
Hilgard and Bruder in turn submit that if the tribunal decides ex aequo et bono or as amiable 
compositeur without the parties’ authorization the award may be challenged on the basis that 
the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties (Art. V(1)(d) of 
the New York Convention and Art. 36(1)(a)(iv) of the Model Law).283 Notably, a challenge 
under Art. V(1)(d) does not constitute a challenge against the tribunal’s jurisdiction but is rather 
a procedural challenge.284 It does not allege that the arbitral tribunal was not the correct forum 
                                               
280 See Born 2014, 3542. Born clarifies that Art. V(1)(c) only authorizes non-recognition where the arbitrators 
exceeded their jurisdiction, not where they made errors, including serious errors, in the exercise of that jurisdiction. 
281 Born 2014, 3555. 
282 See Chapter 2.2. 
283 Hilgard – Bruder 2014, 59; similarly, see Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, 989. Notably, in order to this 
ground to become applicable the tribunal’s wrongful assumption of the powers to act ex aequo et bono or as amiable 
compositeur must have had a meaningful effect on the arbitral process and have materially affected the party’s 
rights. Generally discussing Art. V(1)(d) of the New York Convention, see Born 2014, 3565. 
284 Moses 2008, 195–196. Moses submits that challenges against an award may be divided into two categories, 
jurisdictional and procedural, and the ground for a challenge under Art. V(1)(d) falls within the latter category. 
Similarly, see Born 2014, 110, where it is submitted that whereas Art. V(1)(a) and (c) concern issues of jurisdiction, 
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for the resolution of the dispute but that the tribunal did not follow the rules the parties agreed 
to be applicable and thus acted incorrectly in the course of the proceedings. For this reason, 
when the tribunal has allegedly acted ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur without 
authorization, accepting that the award could be challenged under Art. V(1)(d) seems more 
reasonable than the possibility to challenge the award on the basis of excess of jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, some authorities seem to be of the opinion that none of the grounds for review 
other than violation of public policy are available when the tribunal has unjustifiably exercised 
the power of ex aequo et bono or amiable compositeur. For example, Beisteiner submits that (at 
least under Austrian law) the lack of express consent for a decision ex aequo et bono may not 
as such give rise to an annulment.285 Instead, the award could be set aside only in exceptional 
cases of arbitrary adaptation which amount to a violation of procedural public policy.286 
Similarly, also Craig, Park and Paulsson perceive that the only available grounds to seek 
annulment of the award decided as amiable compositeur are violations of fundamental 
procedural fairness or public policy.287 Thus, giving such powers to the arbitral tribunal would 
serve to greatly reduce any possibility to attack the award.288 Hence, the authors even wonder 
why parties, who often criticize the ”judicialization” of international arbitration procedures and 
the possibility of judicial interference, do not more frequently give the arbitrators the power of 
amiable compositeur.289 According to this perception, the power to decide ex aequo et bono or 
as amiable compositeur cannot therefore be a matter of jurisdiction. 
In the light of the above, an award which the tribunal has rendered ex aequo et bono or as 
amiable compositeur could be challenged either on the ground that the arbitral procedure was 
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties (Art. V(1)(d)) or alternatively on none of 
the grounds of Art. V(1). However, in my view the award could not be annulled on the ground 
                                               
Art. V(1)(d) relates to compliance with the procedural terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement or, absent such 
agreement, the procedural requirements of the arbitral seat. 
285 Beisteiner 2014b, 118, 120. 
286 Beisteiner 2014b, 119. 
287 See Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 354. 
288 Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 354. 
289 Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, 354. According to Born, generally parties agree to arbitration ex aequo et bono or 
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of excess of jurisdiction.290 This is again because the challenge would not attack the tribunal as 
the correct forum but instead question “merely” the proper conduct of the dispute resolution 
process.291 Additionally, this position is supported by the supposition that courts cannot exercise 
the power to decide without adherence to law. Indeed, if the power to decide ex aequo et bono 
or as amiable compositeur was regarded as a jurisdictional issue and neither the tribunal nor the 
court would possess such authority, the consequence would be that no one would have 
jurisdiction on the matter. Such conclusion certainly cannot be accepted primarily due to the 
considerations of the fundamental right of access to justice.292 
This same conclusion can be viewed in the context of contract adaptation. If the award adapting 
the parties’ contract was challenged on the basis of lack of sufficient jurisdiction, it would be 
alleged that adaptation as the required “method” of deciding the dispute does not fall into the 
scope of arbitration but could instead be implemented in litigation. This does not mean that it 
could not in any event be possible that the question of the existence of the arbitrators’ adaptation 
powers concerned its jurisdiction (as long as the state courts are allowed to adapt contracts), but 
it does raise a question of whether that was effectively intended by the parties.293 
Nevertheless, the conclusion that is by no means sought to be made here is that the matter of the 
tribunal’s power to decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur would pertain to 
admissibility any more than it does to jurisdiction. Certainly not, as the challenge against a 
wrongful exercise of such power would not attack the claim but instead the manner exercised 
by the tribunal during the decision-making process. Does this then analogously mean that 
neither the question of the tribunal’s power to adapt the contract can be an issue of admissibility? 
I would not draw such conclusion because despite of the similar characteristics of these two 
“methods” of decision-making, they still do differ from each other to a visible extent. Indeed, 
even though the tribunal would upon a party’s request decide the dispute ex aequo et bono or as 
                                               
290 An opposite conclusion could be reached if the tribunal was alleged to have decided ex aequo et bono or as 
amiable compositeur even though that was not requested by either of the parties. 
291 Thirlway defines that the “jurisdiction” of a court or tribunal is essentially the power to decide according to law 
a dispute of a particular nature between specific parties. Thirlway 2016, 35. Thus, granting the tribunal with 
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4.3.3. 
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amiable compositeur, that probably was not, however, itself the primary request of the 
claimant’s claim. Instead, the issue presumably appears rather as an intermediate procedural 
question similarly to a choice-of-law issue (decided after the tribunal has confirmed its 
jurisdiction as well as admissibility of the claims). In turn, when the tribunal is requested to 
adapt the contract the request for adaptation would constitute the substantive claim itself. In 
other words, whereas the power to decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur concerns 
which rules the tribunal needs to follow when it renders the decision, contract adaptation itself 
is the legal effect sought in arbitration. 
4.3.2 Presumed Intention of the Parties 
Whether or not to raise a preliminary objection, and whether to classify that objection as a 
jurisdictional or admissibility challenge is a matter for the sole decision of the respondent.294 
Thus, the respondent may formulate its objection in a way that it appears to be aimed at the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction.295 The tribunal should not, however, be guided solely by the position 
taken by the objecting party but to have a thorough examination of the parties’ agreement and 
the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether the matter would be better 
considered as to pertain to admissibility.296 Therefore, when faced with doubts as to the correct 
nature of a preliminary objection the arbitral tribunal ought to inquire into the intentions of the 
parties.297 In that regard, the tribunal should question in particular whether the parties intended 
to resolve the dispute in another forum or not at all.298  
The determination of the parties’ factual intention is not however always straightforward. A 
valid point is that at the time the contract was concluded the parties unlikely intended anything 
regarding the characterization of any plausible objection raised in a potential future dispute 
resolution process.299 Indeed, given the unfamiliarity with the separation between jurisdiction 
                                               
294 Thirlway 2016, 170. 
295 Synková 2013, 42. 
296 See Synková 2013, 42. 
297 Paulsson 2005, 616; Synková 2013, 42; in the context of characterizing procedural pre-conditions, Born 2014, 
937; see Park 2007, 154 (“In deciding challenges to arbitral authority, the parties’ intent should serve as the 
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298 Paulsson 2005, 616; Synková 2013, 42. 
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and admissibility even in the legal field,300 it is safe to assume that the negotiating commercial 
parties had never even heard of such concepts. Respectively, they most likely did not give any 
thought to the characterization of a possible dispute over the arbitrators’ procedural power to 
adapt their contract (especially if the parties in fact did not even agree on adaptation as a 
substantive remedy but nevertheless one of them later requires the tribunal do decide over such 
claim). However, another question is whether they did virtually have an idea of the desired 
consequences of not granting the tribunal with the adaptation power. It is not hard to imagine 
that they might have by default understood or assumed that as the tribunal was not granted the 
power to alter the contract, naturally the contract could not be adapted by any other body either. 
Nevertheless, such intention would need to be common between the parties in order to result in 
an agreement, and as the parties presumably did not realize to expressly discuss and agree on 
the matter, such common intention would be hard to verify. 
For that reason, a default rule of the parties’ presumed intention needs to be established.301 
According to Rau, choosing the proper default rule requires us to attribute to the parties, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, the intention to act efficiently in the interest of maximizing 
mutual gains. He submits that these same considerations ought to inform our choice whether to 
characterize a particular objection to arbitration as one of jurisdiction or alternatively as of 
admissibility.302 Similarly, in his analysis on the characterization of noncompliance with pre-
arbitration requirements, Born proposes an approach according to which the characterization of 
an issue as of “admissibility” or “jurisdiction” would be found unhelpful, and instead the proper 
inquiry be considered to be whether parties’ expectations are for arbitral or judicial 
determination.303 Thus, the parties’ presumed intention would be decisive. 
Regarding an applicable presumption rule, Born himself is of the opinion that, in general, the 
presumption should be for arbitral resolution with minimal judicial review.304 That would favor 
admissibility over jurisdiction. The reason for Born’s presumption is that the parties can be 
                                               
300 See Chapter 3.2. 
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302 Rau 2014, 4. 
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expected to desire a single, centralized forum for resolution of their disputes.305 That means that 
by agreeing on arbitration the parties wished to have all their disputes resolved in the same and 
final procedure. If we were to hold otherwise, the consequence would be fragmentation of 
resolution of different types of issues between national courts and the arbitral tribunal. That 
would again produce the risk of multiple proceedings, inconsistent decisions and judicial 
interference in the arbitral proceedings.306 Furthermore, this approach in favor of classifying 
issues as of admissibility rather than jurisdiction has been said to best serve the objectives and 
the ultimate purpose of the New York Convention as it would limit the scope for review of 
arbitral awards and thus enhance their finality and enforceability.307  
Respectively in the context of contract adaptation, if the parties wished somebody to have the 
authority to revise their contract to changed circumstances, they can be expected to have wanted 
such adaptation to be decided by the same decision-making body that would decide any other 
claim arising out of their contract. Contrariwise, if they agreed on arbitration but did not want 
the arbitral tribunal to be authorized to adapt their agreement, they likely did not want to grant 
such power to the courts either.308 Therefore, in absence of any evidence to the contrary,309 a 
procedural challenge against a claim on adaptation should be regarded as concerning the claim’s 
admissibility. Hence, the claim would belong to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction but be 
dismissed due to the inadequacy of the arbitrators’ powers to interfere with the contract. 
Accepting this interpretation would reduce the possibility of parallel proceedings, enhance 
efficiency in the dispute resolution process and promote the profound principle of pro-
arbitration. 
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306 See Born 2014, 937. 
307 Santacroce 2017, 569. 
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4.3.3 Risks of Accepting the Possibility of Finding a Claim on Contract Adaptation 
Inadmissible 
Before accepting the conclusion set forth in the previous chapter, the risks connected to the 
possibility of finding a claim on contract adaptation inadmissible need to be evaluated. First, we 
will generally consider the risk of arbitrators too lightly classifying issues before them as of 
admissibility instead of jurisdiction thereby eliminating the possibility to subsequent court 
review even in cases where it would be justified. Secondly, the potential inadmissibility of a 
claim on contract adaptation (causing the case to be ceased and thus preventing its resolution on 
the merits) is evaluated from the perspective of the fundamental rights of access to court and 
access to justice. 
Regarding the first issue, the decision to classify an issue as of admissibility (and not 
jurisdictional) is, in the first instance, for the arbitrators to make. Indeed, if an adaptation claim 
is brought to arbitration and consequently the other party raises a procedural contestation against 
the arbitrators’ powers to conduct any modification to the agreement, it is up to the arbitral 
tribunal to determine whether to treat the issue as of jurisdiction or admissibility. Admittedly, 
due to the tribunal’s possible unfamiliarity with the differences between jurisdiction and 
admissibility and in particular if the parties have not specifically invoked the inadmissibility 
argument, the characterization may not always be a result of a conscious choice. Nevertheless, 
the tribunal’s action determines the nature of the decision regarding the contestation targeting 
its adaptation powers and simultaneously defines the associated legal consequences including 
the availability for court review. Of course, in order to the tribunal’s determination to have any 
bearing, the court subsequently requested to set aside the award would have to recognise the 
determination and refrain from conducting the review. (And for that reason, the tribunal ought 
to ensure that it is clear from the award when it has actually made a decision on admissibility 
and not on jurisdiction.) 
An exception to the arbitrators’ primacy to decide the nature of the particular issue is made by 
the jurisdictions where, if a dispute is brought to a court and the court is sought to stay the 
proceedings on the basis of an existing arbitration agreement, the court makes a final 
determination of the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.310 In that situation, the court is in the position to 
                                               
310 See Chapter 3.3.2, fn. 132. 
68 
 
make a judgment on whether the ground under which the arbitrators’ jurisdiction is contested 
actually pertains to admissibility of the claim. If the court treats the issue as jurisdictional, it 
makes a final determination on it to which the tribunal is bound. Should the court find that the 
tribunal does not have the jurisdiction, the dispute never reaches arbitration despite of whether 
the matter would have correctly been regarded as concerning admissibility and thereby had to 
be decided by the arbitrators. However, if the court instead holds that the tribunal has the 
jurisdiction, the tribunal that then proceeds with the case could arguably still study the 
admissibility of the claim on the same ground on which the jurisdiction was decided if it 
considers it affects the admissibility. Indeed, in my opinion there should not be anything to 
prevent the tribunal from doing so as long as it follows the court’s ruling on jurisdiction and the 
inadmissibility argument has been invoked by a party.311 
What needs to be pointed out from this is that due to the significant consequences of the 
classification, the arbitral tribunal is left with a power of substantial decision. Indeed, as the 
classification depends on the arbitrators’ decision, it is practically in their discretion whether the 
award may be subsequently reviewed by a court.312 That in turn opens up the possibility to 
classify especially some borderline issues that might otherwise rather be regarded as 
jurisdictional more easily as pertaining to admissibility. Consequently, there would be a risk of 
unjustifiably further narrowing down the possibility to court review and increasing the 
exclusivity of the arbitrators’ adjudicatory powers. It would be unreasonable that simply by 
labelling an issue as of admissibility, the courts would be prevented from conducting control 
over jurisdictional decisions. Notably, following the conclusions set forth in the previous 
chapter, the tribunal could consider a particular question (such as a question of its adaptation 
powers) as pertaining to admissibility and thus limit the possibilities for challenging the award 
even when the parties’ actual intent cannot be established.313  
On the other hand, the probability of the described risk can validly be doubted as, in the light of 
the preceding case law discussed earlier in this study,314 it seems more likely that the courts keep 
                                               
311 The parties’ burden of raising the objection to admissibility was discussed earlier in Chapter 3.4.2. 
312 Pursuant to Gouiffès and Ordonez, “[a]n extensive interpretation of the grounds for inadmissibility would 
therefore provide arbitral tribunals with wide discretion as to which claims they should or should not hear, while a 
broad interpretation of the grounds leading to a lack of jurisdiction would extend the scope of review of their 
findings”. Gouiffes – Ordonez 2015, 108. 
313 See Chapter 4.3.2. 
314 See Chapter 3.2.2. 
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intervening the arbitrators’ decisions regardless of whether the tribunal had in fact made a 
decision on admissibility and at least by reviewing whether the made classification was 
correct.315 In fact, it is a relevant question at this point whether courts’ review over the 
classification made by arbitrators should be actually openly admitted. In other words, when 
decisions on admissibility are not subject to review, should the classification made by the 
tribunal be reviewable? If we were to say yes, the availability of such review would act as a 
safeguard for maintaining jurisdictional issues in the courts’ reach and allowing arbitrators to 
rule solely on matters they were empowered to have jurisdiction on. Simultaneously the 
admissibility decision itself would not – as it should not – be exposed to court determination.  
Such conclusion seems to be eventually indispensable because the court may set aside the award 
if it contains decisions beyond the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.316 That requires that the court is 
entitled to take a stand on whether the tribunal has in fact made a decision on jurisdiction 
irrespective of how the tribunal itself perceived and labelled the issue. Furthermore, if the 
identification of admissibility situations would be left solely to individual arbitral tribunals 
giving their rulings in confidential proceedings, no consistent criteria and practice on the 
separation between jurisdiction and admissibility issues would be established. Instead, the lack 
of clarity and foreseeability in the application of the concepts would be further increased. 
The second risk connected to the possibility of finding a claim on adaptation inadmissible relates 
to the consequences of such finding for the dispute itself. As has been noted before, when a 
claim is found inadmissible the legal processing of the particular case ceases there. Thus, the 
inadmissibility ruling has virtually the same effects than a tribunal’s decision on the merits. Yet, 
the noteworthy difference is that the dispute will not at all be decided on its substance (at any 
forum). Such consequence is not that drastic in a situation where the ground for inadmissibility 
may be subsequently repaired. For example, in case of non-fulfilment of a pre-arbitration 
negotiation obligation the dispute will be heard and resolved by the tribunal once the procedural 
pre-condition has been complied with. But the case is different when the inadmissibility is 
                                               
315 Cf. Santacroce who submits that “at the transnational level, the trend is for state courts to construe the category 
of jurisdictional issues narrowly, thereby reducing the scope for review of arbitral awards. By applying 
transnational standards as drawn from a comparative analysis of scholarly works, arbitral awards and court 
decisions under the New York Convention, state courts would foster the pro-enforcement policy of the New York 
Convention.” Santacroce 2017, 568.  
316 See Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. 
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permanent. This includes a situation where the claim is dismissed due to inadequacy of the 
arbitrators’ procedural powers to decide an adaptation dispute. Such inadmissibility could not 
be repaired unless the parties mutually agree to subsequently grant the tribunal with such 
powers. 
Consequently, if a claim on contract adaptation is found inadmissible, the dispute over the 
adaptation is, so to speak, left in the air without any available forum for its substantive 
resolution. This was what seemed to bother also the moot court judges in the Vis Moot the most. 
It appeared as going against their logic and sense of justice to admit that an arisen dispute 
between the parties could be left without a conclusion on its the merits. Therefore, it is necessary 
to consider whether such outcome can indeed be accepted especially from the perspective of the 
fundamental rights of access to court and access to justice.317 
Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides that in the determination 
of his civil rights and obligations, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.318 The article 
embodies the fundamental principle of access to court, one of the corner stones of the rule of 
law. Regarding the application of Art. 6, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
specifically stated that the right of access to a court includes not only the right to institute 
proceedings but also the right to obtain a “determination” of the dispute by a court. According 
to the ECtHR, it would be inconceivable for Art. 6(1) to describe in detail procedural guarantees 
afforded to litigants – proceedings that are fair, public and expeditious – without guaranteeing 
the parties that their civil disputes will be finally determined.319 
It may be pondered whether the set requirement for a final determination of the dispute may be 
fulfilled by a tribunal’s inadmissibility ruling, which is practically a final decision on the case, 
or whether it presumes a final determination on the merits. It seems, however, reasonable to 
                                               
317 Also Born remarks the access to court standpoint when analyzing the status of pre-arbitration requirements by 
submitting that “it is also important that pre-arbitration negotiation and litigation requirements not limit the parties’ 
access to justice. These provisions create the risk that parties will be prevented from pursuing presumptively 
meritorious claims, and obtaining presumptively justified relief, in the parties’ agreed forum for dispute resolution.” 
Born 2014, 932. 
318 This right is proclaimed also e.g. by Art. 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
319 Kutić v. Croatia (2001), para. 25, cited in Sladič 2017, 210. 
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understand that finally determining a dispute means a thorough resolution of the actual dispute 
i.e. the merits of the case. This view is taken also for example by Sladič who suggests that access 
to justice shall be understood as meaning a right to get a decision on the merits of a civil action, 
be it, for example, a declaration on the existence or non-existence of a right or a creation, 
termination or modification of a right, obligation or legal relation.320  
However, access to court is not an absolute right but may be limited.321 In that regard, the ECtHR 
has specifically found that the right of access to court can be legitimately limited at the stage of 
admissibility.322 Thus, admissibility considerations may create a justified limitation to access to 
court. Notably, also the ECHR itself explicitly provides for certain admissibility criteria in Art. 
35, which need to be fulfilled in order to the Court to be able to deal with the matter. But is a 
situation where no judicial body can decide if the contract should be adapted an acceptable 
limitation to access to court? It has been submitted that access to court could not be limited 
unless strict conditions are met. For example, Sladič purports that any condition of admissibility 
is required to be defined by law, must pursue a legitimate aim and must comply with the 
principle of proportionality.323 Yet, in the light of the general non-recognition of admissibility 
in regulations, the possible grounds for inadmissibility are rarely explicitly provided for by the 
legislation applicable in the arbitration proceedings.324 And even more certainly the law does 
not specifically define the inadequacy of the exercisable powers granted to the arbitrators as an 
available condition of admissibility. Does it then automatically follow that such ground cannot 
be a valid ground for finding the claim inadmissible? 
Sladič talks about admissibility in the context of court proceedings. However, when it comes to 
arbitration, the principle of party autonomy forms a fundamentality. Due to the party autonomy 
and the parties’ wide discretion to agree on their procedure, it is to be recognized that the ground 
                                               
320 Sladič 2017, 212. Sladič also makes a reference to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia that has 
explicitly submitted that the right to judicial protection does not mean solely a right to proceedings and to a judicial 
decision, but also a right to a decision on the merits. Case no. Up-107/99, cited in Sladič 2017, 210. 
321 See e.g. Sladič 2017, 210; see the ECtHR’s decision Markovic and Others v. Italy (2006), para. 99 (“The right 
is not absolute, however. It may be subject to legitimate restrictions such as statutory limitation periods, security 
for costs orders, regulations concerning minors and persons of unsound mind.”). 
322 See Obermeier v. Austria (1990), where the ECtHR submitted that the mere fact that the party’s action for a 
declaration was held to be inadmissible on the ground that he lacked a legal interest does not mean that he was 
denied access to a court, always provided that his submissions in the revocation proceedings were the subject of a 
genuine examination (para. 68). Cited in Sladič 2017, 210. 
323 Sladič 2017, 211–212, 235. 
324 See Chapter 3.2.1. 
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for inadmissibility of a claim may result from the parties’ agreement. And when classifying an 
issue of the arbitrators’ procedural powers to adapt a contract either as of admissibility or 
jurisdiction, not only the four corners of the contract but also the parties’ presumed intentions 
may need to be relied upon.325 Of course, in order to avoid violating the right of access to court, 
such presumed intention supporting the classification of the issue as of admissibility needs to 
be justified in the light of the factual circumstances of the particular case. 
In addition, as was noted earlier, if the courts of the particular jurisdiction would not have the 
powers to adapt the contract either, the possibility to define a claim on adaptation inadmissible 
in arbitration is even more justified.326 In my view, when considering the acceptability of a 
situation where a particular dispute is left without determination on its merits it is essential that 
there exists a forum where the dispute may be referred to and which recognizes the case within 
its jurisdiction. It would be untenable that no such forum existed, and the parties would be 
completely left without a judicial body they could resort to – regardless of whether the claim is 
actually justified or even in any way rational. Nevertheless, as long as there exists a forum that 
possesses jurisdiction and is able to define at least the admissibility of the claim, considering a 
claim unable to be settled by a third party would not in principle violate access to court. In other 
words, somebody always needs to have the jurisdiction but not all claims have to be admissible.  
Furthermore, one argument that could be raised in relation to the requirement of final 
determination of the parties’ dispute is that the party requesting the arbitral tribunal to modify 
the contract could possibly seek the same outcome also on some alternative ground that is 
assuredly included in the tribunal’s mandate already on the basis of the arbitration agreement. 
For example, instead of asking the tribunal to increase the price by changing the contract, the 
party could argue that the contract ought to be interpreted in the way that the price was actually 
agreed higher.327 In that situation, at least partly the same factual background could potentially 
be relied upon than when validating an adaptation claim.328 Thus, the legal measure exercised 
                                               
325 See Chapter 4.3.2. 
326 See Chapter 4.2.4. 
327 Of course, such position could be more difficult to prove and thus less favorable for the party. Anyway, from 
the perspective of access to justice, the matter could at least be brought before the arbitral tribunal for determination. 
328 However, as was noted in Chapter 2.1, the ways parties may want their contracts to be adapted may be very 
different and relying on an alternative legal basis (such as an interpretation of the contract) in order to achieve the 
desired outcome is not an option. For example, when a party does not want to request a price increase (i.e. money) 
but instead an extension of a performance deadline or a clear alteration of the contractual obligations from what 
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by the tribunal would be different but materially the dispute between the parties would be 
factually the same. In that sense, the party would not definitely be deprived from the final 
determination of the dispute even if the adaptation claim was found inadmissible due to the 
inadequacy of the arbitrators’ powers. 
 
                                               
was initially agreed on, the outcome may not be possible to achieve by any other mechanism than a fair adaptation 
of the contract terms. On the other hand, it could perhaps from one viewpoint be argued that still materially the 
matter would get a final determination when the other party subsequently initiates arbitration to claim e.g. damages 
due to an undue or non-conforming delivery and the opposing party has the opportunity to raise its arguments in 
defence that may be similar to what it would have put forward in the adaptation procedure. However, such argument 
would perhaps quite rightly receive critique of whether the dispute would in that case still in fact be the “same”. 
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5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the possible grounds on which a party could contest a 
claim requesting adaptation of the parties’ contract in arbitration. It was first noted in Chapter 2 
that contract adaptation is to a considerable extent different kind of decision-making than 
settling a traditional dispute. When a party requests adaptation of the contract, the tribunal is 
asked to reshape the parties’ future contractual relationship, which may include creating new 
obligations for the parties upon the tribunal’s discretion. Thus, the decision-making includes a 
creative or innovative element thereby denoting wider discretion and requiring high competence 
from the arbitrators not only in the legal area but also for example in the economic, financial or 
technical field. Furthermore, when the contract is changed and not merely interpreted and 
applied, the outcome of the decision becomes more unpredictable for the parties. For these 
reasons, it is not self-evident that parties want arbitrators to possess the powers to adapt their 
contract even if they wanted them to solve their disputes through traditional dispute settlement. 
The focus of this study was on the available preliminary objections that a party could raise when 
its counter-party initiates arbitration and demands adaptation of the contract. In particular, the 
study aimed at determining how a preliminary objection opposing the arbitral tribunal’s 
procedural powers to adapt the parties’ contract ought to be classified in the obscure division 
between jurisdiction and admissibility. In legal literature and case law the issue has so far been 
by default understood as an issue pertaining to the arbitrators’ jurisdiction. It was critically 
considered in this study whether such view is actually the most accurate and well-grounded 
perception. However, first, in order to create a base for such review and to demonstrate the 
relevance of the precise classification of the preliminary objections, the relevant differences 
between jurisdiction and admissibility were examined. 
The key findings in Chapter 3 (that answer the first research question of this study about the 
difference between challenges to jurisdiction and challenges to admissibility) included firstly 
that whereas challenging the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction intends is to send the particular 
dispute to a court instead of arbitration, an admissibility challenge seeks to cease the legal 
processing of the case altogether. Thus, while a jurisdictional challenge attacks the tribunal, an 
admissibility challenge is aimed at the particular claim. That notion is relevant when considering 
the parties’ legitimate expectations: did the parties intend that (regardless of their general 
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agreement to arbitrate) the particular claim could not be heard in arbitration but should instead 
be brought to a court or did they intend that the claim could not be at all settled by a third party? 
The characterization of a particular preliminary issue either as of jurisdictional or admissibility 
should always be made carefully and by taking into account the following consequences and 
their compatibility with the (presumed) intentions of the parties. 
The second main difference between jurisdiction and admissibility concerns the finality of the 
decision. While arbitrators’ decisions on jurisdiction are necessarily reviewable by courts, issues 
concerning admissibility fall within the scope of arbitrators’ exclusive adjudicatory powers and 
are thus non-reviewable. In addition, it was considered that arbitrators may not regard the 
claim’s admissibility by their own initiative, but such arguments need to be raised by the parties. 
Thus, if the party has not alleged that the claim is inadmissible (but has for example only 
objected the jurisdiction) the tribunal should consider that the party has waived the possibility 
to raise such objection. Therefore, the parties should be particularly mindful of how to formulate 
and classify their preliminary objections. 
Furthermore, arbitrators should indicate the characterization they have adopted clearly in the 
award in order to avoid unjustified court intervention in admissibility rulings. The need for such 
clarity and express statement in the award is emphasized when the ground for the 
(in)admissibility is perhaps less known and not generally acknowledged among the courts of the 
particular jurisdiction. Respectively at a pre-award stage when a particular claim is brought 
before a court, the existence of doubts as to the nature of a preliminary objection ought to be 
solved by referring the matter to the arbitrators’ determination.329 This provides a safe solution 
for the courts by which they avoid violating the principle of competence–competence and 
overstepping the arbitrators’ jurisdiction to decide admissibility issues.  
The second research question of this study (considered in Chapter 4) was whether a claim on 
contract adaptation could be found inadmissible due to the inadequacy of the arbitrators’ powers 
(or whether the issue always pertains to the arbitrators’ jurisdiction). First, the nature of the issue 
was examined as jurisdictional, which seems to be the characterization (more or less 
consciously) adopted by the legal commentators as well as the available case law. The 
challenges to arbitrators’ jurisdiction are separated to two levels: challenges to arbitrability and 
                                               
329 Similarly, Synková 2013, 42. 
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to the arbitrators’ procedural powers in the individual case. In the current review, due to the 
general permitting of adaptation in arbitration among states, the focus was on the second level. 
It was considered that if the question of the arbitrators’ powers to adapt the contract was 
regarded as jurisdictional, the tribunal’s decision could be reviewed on the ground that the claim 
requesting adaptation was outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. Yet, what is 
problematic in characterizing the issue as jurisdictional is the uncertainty in the existence of the 
state courts’ jurisdiction to adapt the contract in case the arbitrators would be found to lack such 
jurisdiction. While jurisdictional issues constitute an either-or situation between litigation and 
arbitration, such substituting jurisdiction of the courts is indeed a necessity in order to avoid a 
situation where nobody would have the jurisdiction in the case.  
Furthermore, characterizing the question of the arbitrators’ powers to adapt the parties’ contract 
as jurisdictional would in case of a negative decision on the tribunal’s jurisdiction cause 
decentralization of different claims to different forums. However, when the parties have agreed 
on arbitration through a general arbitration clause, they can be presumed to have intended that 
different disputes would not be fragmented between arbitration and litigation. Thus, such 
characterization would presumably contradict the parties’ intentions. In this regard, it is 
suggested that the pro-arbitration principle and the need for promoting minimal judicial 
interference in arbitration to avoid multiple proceedings do not require only that the available 
court review is limited to jurisdictional issues but also that the users of international arbitration 
rethink what actually constitutes a jurisdictional issue.330 First and foremost, the characterization 
of the particular issue should be evaluated individually in each case and not labelled 
automatically as pertaining the tribunal’s jurisdiction when the ultimate consequence is that the 
issue is always in the end finally decided by a court. 
Consequently, the ultimate conclusion reached in Chapter 4 was that the question of the 
arbitrators’ procedural powers to adapt the parties’ contract would be better characterized (as a 
default rule) as an issue of admissibility. If the parties wished somebody to have the authority 
to revise their contract to changed circumstances, they can be expected to have wanted such 
adaptation to be decided by the same decision-making body that would decide any other claim 
                                               
330 See Rau, who accurately points out that “[f]or surely it is a familiar point that just about every conceivable 
objection to arbitration can be framed as implicating arbitral “jurisdiction,” in the sense that it potentially qualifies 
the nature and extent of party agreement”. Rau 2014, 13 
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arising out of their contract. Contrariwise, if they agreed on arbitration but did not want the 
arbitral tribunal to be authorized to adapt their agreement, they likely did not want to grant such 
power to the courts either. Hence, an additional possible ground for inadmissibility, i.e. 
inadequacy of the decision-maker’s powers (in which context the word “power” is not regarded 
as a synonym for jurisdiction), was proposed to be recognized. 
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